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The power transitions precipitated by the Arab Spring revolutions afford opportunity for 
significant positive political and economic change.  However, the specific areas in which 
improvement is most essential to generating economic advancement are less obvious than 
those associated with improved governance, and are less likely to be uniform across all 
countries involved.  In consideration of that assertion, this thesis identifies areas most 
correlated with economic growth, the fostering of a positive entrepreneurial environment 
and progression to a more advanced economic stage of development through employment 
of two distinct statistical methods, and applies them to the North African countries 
affected by the Arab Spring revolutions.  Areas in which improvement is required to 
create positive change that are specific to the country being studied are thereby 
determined.  The cases of pre-Arab Spring Libya, Tunisia and Egypt were examined in an 
attempt to provide guidance and focus for the enormous tasks of governmental 
construction and reform the incoming administrations of each country will face.  The 
ultimate outcome of the analysis is an expression of the vicious economic cycle unique to 
each, including a determination of causal factors identified as areas in which 
improvement will be most likely to favorably transform their economies. 
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I. OVERVIEW 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The changes in government currently occurring in the Middle East and North 
Africa as a result of the Arab Spring revolutions have provided an opportunity for 
significant positive transformation to become manifest within those countries.  
Particularly, there may be potential for vast economic improvement to occur in countries 
wherein authoritarian regimes appear to have, in many cases, stifled economic 
advancement through corruption, power-hoarding, or ineptitude.  However, the degree to 
which government has been the limiting factor in the evolution of these economies, 
particularly when considered within the context of all countries in a similar stage of 
development, is unclear.  Moreover, the specific areas that have constrained the economic 
growth and advancement of each country have not been clearly identified. 
The North African countries of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia were, prior to the events 
of the Arab Spring, examples of countries in part defined by governmental stability 
coupled with less-than-optimal economic performance.  As those regimes have 
completely eroded and ceased to exist, the areas in which those governments contributed 
to and exacerbated the inability of the respective countries to advance toward more 
prosperity should be considered.  There may then be potential to determine upon which 
areas post-Arab Spring governments should focus in order to most efficiently improve 
upon the economic performance of the previous regimes in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.  
This thesis will attempt to elucidate that subject, through determining which factors—
both within and separate from government—have been most responsible for the relatively 
poor economic performance of those three countries when considered on a global scale.  
Additionally, it will help to provide a blueprint for the incoming governments of each 
country by identifying areas that, if properly reformed, may increase growth and foster an 
environment conducive to increased entrepreneurship leading to improved 
macroeconomic performance. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
This work will generate significant conclusions with respect to the structure 
and/or policies required of the new governments installed in the North African countries 
to produce positive economic results.  Moreover, the specific areas where the previous 
governments were particularly weak will be defined and can therefore be more easily 
guarded against and potentially improved upon.  The limiting factors precluding these 
countries from attaining a stronger organic entrepreneurial presence will also be 
determined.  Those limiting factors can then become the focus for further research and 
potentially increased attention and strategic manipulation in the future. 
The occasion to create a new government, complete with new processes and 
structures, and with the potential to both reform existing institutions as well as create new 
ones, is a rare opportunity that in the case of the North African countries has implications 
beyond the welfare of their citizenry.  The future direction of these countries has 
significant geo-strategic implications, and the economic prosperity of the people within 
them will influence the political reality that will become manifest over the next several 
years.  Therefore, it is important that a determination of which factors have limited their 
economic success in the past is made; and that an evaluation of what these nascent 
governments can do to improve upon past failures is performed.  This thesis will provide 
such an evaluation and determination through analysis of empirical data taken from the 
pre-revolution era.  It will produce results that will be useful regardless of the areas in 
which each government is found to have fostered a negative economic environment in the 
past.  While the findings of this research will only present a partial picture of the 
synthesis between government and economy within each country, it will produce strong 
evidence regarding which areas of each economy should be the focus not only of further 
research, but also of the incoming governments of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The hypothesis that served as the genesis for this work is that specific areas of 
governmental ineptitude have produced, to a greater degree than average, the relatively 
poor economic performance of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.  This supposition implies that 
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the potential for significantly improved economic performance exists if these areas are 
improved by the incoming governments.  It is likely the evidence will show that all three 
countries can appreciably improve their economies with focus on the proper areas.  The 
initial problem, then, is to determine which factors are the most influential in limiting 
countries’ economic advancement depending upon what level of economic advancement 
they currently enjoy.  It is then important to determine in which of these factors a 
particular government has underperformed relative to other countries at a similar 
development level.  This will provide evidence regarding which factors most significantly 
constrain the advancement of the particular economy being studied to a more developed 
stage might be.  These problems will be addressed and through the results of the research 
undertaken herein.   
A second underlying hypothesis of this work is that the governments of these 
three countries failed to provide the proper incentives to appropriately promote 
entrepreneurship—thus retarding economic growth.  Accordingly, this thesis will 
consider the potential for economic improvement through the fostering of organic 
entrepreneurship within each country as outlined in the nascent field of expeditionary 
economics.  Following the crisis that resulted in a change of government in each case, 
this field of study suggests that a more effective approach to improving economic 
circumstance involves the international community helping to create an environment 
conducive to increased firm creation and growth.  This is in direct contrast to the current 
construct, which is most heavily reliant upon how much economic aid to appropriate and 
how to administer that aid to the post-conflict/crisis state.  In order to effectively 
determine a method of creating an environment conducive to entrepreneurship in each 
country, the specific areas that have prevented such an environment from existing in the 
past must be determined.  This thesis will provide empirical evidence that will identify 
these problem areas in the three countries upon which the study focuses.  The identified 
areas can then be prioritized as topics requiring increased attention by both the incoming 
governments and the international community.  
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Significant amounts of literature have been produced for the cases of Egypt, 
Tunisia and Libya evaluating the economic effects of their respective governmental 
policies.  However, as a work of empirical scholarship, this thesis will not rely upon any 
of these for support, but rather will produce an analysis supported solely by the 
quantitative evidence that will be derived herein.  Regardless, an exploration of pertinent 
literature is required for methodological explanation and clarification as well as to 
address work providing either support or potentially conflicting analyses for the 
conclusions obtained.  In order to achieve the necessary degree of understanding for this 
subject matter, two separate areas of information must be examined.  First, an overview 
of some of the most important work regarding the political economies of North African 
countries, and the prospects for growth as a result of the Arab Spring will be examined.  
This will be followed by a review of works pertinent to the methodological structure 
logic of the approach of this thesis as well as an overview of the field of expeditionary 
economics. 
There is a consensus within the literature that the pre-revolution governments of 
these three countries had an on-balance negative effect on their economies.  Henry and 
Springborg explain that prior to the Arab Spring, both Egypt and Tunisia could be 
categorized as “bully states” or praetorian regimes, while the Qaddafi-led government in 
Libya was characterized as a “bunker state.”  These were identified as the least successful 
categories delineated, and were shown to produce poorer results than the Middle 
East/North African (MENA) countries belonging to the other categories defined.1  Julia 
Devlin generalizes that MENA governments have instituted unhealthy degrees of control 
and have fostered structures that have failed to provide the proper incentives to promote 
private investment and ease market entry for entrepreneurs.2  While the degree to which 
the three countries being studied herein have been more or less successful than others in 
                                                 
1 Clement Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle 
East, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 160. 
2 Devlin, Julia C., Challenges of Economic Development in the Middle East and North Africa Region:  
World Scientific Studies in International Economics, Vol. 8 (London: World Scientific Publishing 
Company, 2010), 511. 
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the region is not explicitly discussed by Devlin, evidence presented throughout the work 
suggests that at least in the cases of Libya and Egypt, development as a result of 
governmental policies has lagged even the regional trends and averages.  Other analyses 
have shown that institutional weaknesses as well as persistent social conflict (exemplified 
and exacerbated through the Arab Spring movement) have precluded North African 
economies from advancing on par with those of East Asia.3  This failure has resulted in 
the MENA countries being perceived as less attractive than other developing countries 
with which they are competing for potential international investment opportunities. 
Evidence has been identified and analyzed regarding specific areas of economic 
improvement in some or all of these countries, though even these assessments generally 
conclude with a poor outlook for sustainment into the future.4  Creane, Goyal, Mobarak 
and Sab find that the financial sector including banking institutions in Egypt and Tunisia 
improved relatively quickly since the 1960s when compared to other countries within the 
MENA region, though the reforms undertaken failed to keep pace with other parts of the 
world, particularly Asia.5  The closed nature of the Libyan regime prevented its inclusion 
in these works due to a lack of required data, though Oliver Miles (former UK 
Ambassador to Libya) suggests that despite high oil prices and rescinded economic 
sanctions, the Libyan economy has failed to prosper, due to “the failure of the Libyan 
administration to adapt to the new situation, and to take the necessary operational 
decisions.”6  Robert Springborg considers Egypt due to its potential as a trendsetter in the 
region, and finds that the demography, macroeconomic instability and lack of security 
suggest an environment unlikely to transform the current destructive cycle into a more 
                                                 
3 Ibrahim A. Elbadawi supplies an excellent study of this phenomenon in “Reviving Growth in the 
Arab World,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 53, no. 2 (January 2005), 293–326. 
4 See Ahmed Galal and Khalid Sekkat, “Development Prospects for North Africa,” Economic 
Research Forum (ERF), Policy Perspective No. 1, January 6, 2010, for a discussion of the reduction in 
poverty in North Africa during the first decade of the new century despite poor growth. They conclude that 
this reduction is not sustainable without reform of governance and economic policies resulting in increased 
economic growth. 
5 Susan Creane, Rishi Goyal, A. Mushfiq Mobarak and Randa Sab, “Measuring Financial 
Development in the Middle East and North Africa: A New Database,” IMF Staff Papers 53, no. 3 (2006), 
508. 
6 Oliver Miles, “Toward a Closer Relationship Between Libya and the Foreign Business Community,” 
in Doing Business in Libya (London:  Kogan Page Limited, 2002), 5. 
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positive virtuous one wherein improved government creates better economic 
circumstances which in turn fosters even better governance.7  Most germane to the focus 
of this paper, Nabli, Keller, Nassif and Silva-Jauregui conclude that while the complexity 
and diversity inherent in the region mandates a tailored set of policies specific to each 
MENA country, governance reform is the avenue by which economic prosperity will 
most readily be achieved.8  The literature on the causes and relative success of the 
countries being studied is robust, though the general absence of identification of specific 
areas of insufficiency on which to focus the efforts of the international community and 
incoming governments provides the gap in knowledge that this thesis will begin to fill.  
The most significant work of scholarship in this area is the World Bank’s MENA 
Development Report which does provide specific solutions to economic issues of 
advancement in the region, though these are not country-specific, but rather solutions for 
the region as a whole.9 
The approach of this paper begins with the comparison of countries based on level 
of economic advancement.  Walter W. Rostow first categorized countries via his work on 
economic stages which included (1) the traditional society, (2) the preconditions for 
takeoff, (3) the takeoff, (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of high mass 
consumption.10  Several other methods of categorization have since been produced in an 
effort to facilitate comparison of countries at a similar stage of economic maturity.  
Jeffrey Sachs organized his economic development theory around a formula based on 
                                                 
7 See Robert Springborg, “The Precarious Economics of Arab Springs,” Survival 53, no. 6 (2011), 85–
104. 
8 Mustapha K. Nabli, Jennifer Keller, Claudia Nassif, and Carlos Silva-Jauregui, “The Political 
Economy of Industrial Policy in the Middle East and North Africa,” in Industrial Policy in the Middle East 
and North Africa:  Rethinking the Role of the State, edited by Ahmed Galal (Cairo: The American 
University in Cairo Press, 2008), 128. 
9 This refers to the analysis found in: From Privilege to Competition: Unlocking Private-Led Growth 
in the Middle East and North Africa. MENA Development Report (Washington, DC:  World Bank, 2009), 
16–24. This work provides the most similar analysis to this thesis, and while it is noted that the solutions 
roadmap presented is dependent upon each country’s specific situation, there is no dedication to the 
particulars with respect to Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. This, combined with the unique methodology utilized 
herein, provides the opportunity for original research heretofore absent from academia. 
10 Taken from E. Wayne Nafziger, Economic Development, 4th edition (London:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 128, and originally published in Walter W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic 
Growth (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962). 
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three stages through which a country should advance (and at which it may get stuck) 
defined as commercial, industrial and knowledge-based economies.11  This provides a 
useful model and is similar to (and possibly the basis for) the template produced by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF), which will be used in this thesis.  The WEF categorizes 
economies as factor-driven, efficiency-driven and innovation-driven, with pillars 
identified as key for economies in each stage.12  These categorizations, along with 
multiple data sets that will provide the information requirements for this paper, were 
manipulated by Robert Looney for the purpose of creating a framework whereby the 
factors that have inhibited an economy from advancing can be identified.13  This thesis 
will build upon this work by determining the performance of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt in 
each of the limiting factors identified as most significant through Looney’s 
methodological structure.  It will then identify the areas in which the previous 
governments were particularly deficient, as well as the specific areas where 
improvements are most likely to produce stage advancement.  The goal of which is to 
produce a result that can help to fill the gap in specific-area-need identification. 
Due to the crisis resultant of the Arab Spring, the current situation can in some 
respects be case studies for the field of expeditionary economics.  Though the original 
idea behind the field generally involved military involvement in the creation of an 
entrepreneurial model for reconstruction in the post-conflict state, the principles can be 
applied despite the absence of international military forces in the cases being studied.14  
The potential of the individual, and the assumption that individuals will take advantage of 
                                                 
11 See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Stages of Economic Development, transcript from speech given at Chinese 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, Beijing, June 19, 2004. 
12 Xavier Sala-I-Martin, Jennifer Blanke, Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz, Thierry Geiger and Irene Mia, 
“The Global Competitiveness Index 2010–2011:  Looking Beyond the Global Economic Crisis,” in The 
Global Competitiveness Report, 2010–2011, ed. Klaus Schwab (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010), 
9. 
13 See Robert Looney, “Entrepreneurship and the Process of Development:  A Framework for Applied 
Expeditionary Economics in Pakistan,” Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, February, 2012. 
14 Carl Schramm provides the blueprint for Expeditionary Economics in, “Expeditionary Economics:  
Spurring Growth After Conflicts and Disasters,” Foreign Affairs May/June (2010): 89–99. According to 
Robert Looney, in more recent correspondence with the Kauffman Foundation, expeditionary economics 
has evolved into the development of an entrepreneur-based model for reconstruction in any post-crisis 
situation, regardless of military involvement. This is due to the unlikelihood of interventions similar to Iraq 
and Afghanistan in the future. 
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economic opportunity if properly incentivized to do so, is the foundation upon which 
both expeditionary economics and the examination of factors limiting the fostering of 
entrepreneurship contained herein are founded.15  This foundation will be applied 
throughout the analysis presented in the cases of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The methodology of this thesis is based on the presumption that each country’s 
particular circumstances are to a large degree resultant of governmental policies in 
particular areas, rather than their poor performance being a result of their particular 
circumstances.16  While this thesis does not dispute that factor endowments and 
geography (among other things beyond the control of government) are important to the 
economic prospects of any country, it is the supposition of this paper that the policies of 
any government can and should be tailored to produce the most favorable result.  These 
policies will be in part based on the natural resources and geography of the country.  
However, the factor endowments of a country are represented within the data being 
examined.  For example, Libya is endowed with significant hydrocarbon resources not 
enjoyed by Tunisia.  However, based on the data regarding its manufacturing sector, 
tourism, etc., its per capita GDP should be significantly lower than actual.  The oil 
endowment of the country is therefore captured in the data since its per capita GDP is 
higher than would be anticipated had it not existed.  Of course, this is a simplified 
example attempting to explain complex and inter-connected economies, but the premise 
is clear.  Therefore the areas in which each country performs particularly poorly are 
deemed to be a result of policies that fail to take advantage of the circumstances within 
the country—not a result of the existence or lack of any particular endowments.  In other 
words, the proper policies can create a relatively favorable result regardless of the 
specific circumstances that are beyond the government’s control—though it is quite 
                                                 
15 See multiple examples of the application of Expeditionary Economics in the Kauffman Foundation 
Research Series:  Expeditionary Economics, November, 2010. 
16 Paul Collier and David Dollar, “Can the World Cut Poverty in Half? How Policy Reform and 
Effective Aid Can Meet International Development Goals,” World Development 29, no. 11 (November 
2001): 1787. 
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likely that proper policies combined with favorable endowments can create an even more 
favorable result than good government without those endowments.  
As previously described, an empirical analysis of both governmental areas of 
underperformance retarding growth and entrepreneurship as well as factors constraining 
the economic development of these countries to a more advanced stage is particularly 
valuable due to the current situation in which significant change to structure and policy is 
inevitable.  The data requirements and methodology to be utilized in this study to meet 
these ends involves what can be described as a statistical comparative analysis.  There are 
two statistical methods that will be used to generate the results for this research.  The first 
is discriminant analysis.  It is essentially a method that, through statistical means, allows 
one to determine which factors of the set being examined distinguish a particular group 
(in this case, a group of countries) within a more general one.  In other words, it can 
explain (at least to some degree) the most important variables that must be changed and 
improved in order for a country to be reclassified to a more advanced category.  If a main 
criterion being used to classify countries is income measured via purchasing power parity 
GDP per capita (as it is in the categorization method used by the Global Competitiveness 
Report), then the conclusion is that improvement in variables identified as statistically 
significant in classifying countries to the next stage of development will lead to 
macroeconomic success.17  The 12 pillars of the WEF Global Competitiveness Index 
(GCI), the six indicators of governance provided by the World Bank, the 11 dimensions 
of Economic Freedom found at Heritage House as well as the 17 dimensions of 
transformation found in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index will be used to this end.18  
This will also be used to determine the most significant variables for the Middle 
East/North African (MENA) countries as compared to the world as a whole.19  Upon 
determining these most statistically significant factors, an examination of the 
                                                 
17 There are actually two criteria used for country classification, GDP per capita at market exchange 
rates, and percentage of exports made up by minerals. This is explained in detail in Chapter II as referenced 
in:  World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011, 10. 
18 The utilization of each dataset will be explained more comprehensively in Chapter II. 
19 It may be necessary to omit Group 5 countries from the general population since they are at the 
most advanced stage of development, and therefore cannot move to a progressively “better” group. 
 10
performance of the particular country being studied in these areas can determine the areas 
most likely to produce significant positive change if focused upon and improved.  
The second method to be used is factor analysis, which is a technique of reducing 
data sets with many different components to determine how many distinct phenomena are 
being measured.20   The component data from the previously identified data sets will be 
combined into a single data set, and the factor analysis will categorize each indicator into 
a titled phenomenon—the variable components of which are related to a degree of 
statistical significance.21  There is significant overlap in these data sets, though 
differences in methodology create different results, thus the ranking of Egypt for the 
factor “Rule of Law” as defined by World Governance Indicators, for example, will vary 
from its ranking for the same variable title in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index.  
These two variables, though named identically, may even be found to be measuring 
significantly different phenomena.  Less obvious is an example of the concept of factor 
analysis wherein the variables are titled quite differently.   Consider the World Bank 
Governance Indicators titled “Control of Corruption” and “Government Effectiveness.”  
Through the executed component analysis executed, they may be found to be measuring 
much the same phenomenon, while “Political Stability” from the same data set may be 
measuring something distinctly different from those, but much the same as Heritage 
House’s variable of “Trade Freedom.”22   
Intermediate variables used as proxy measures for economic growth and strength 
of the entrepreneurial environment will be added to the dataset described above and 
included in the factor analysis.  These dependent variables and the different components 
of the independent variables in the data sets used can be categorized efficiently through 
this method.  The goal of this reclassification will be to find which category each of the 
                                                 
20 See Robert Looney, “Entrepreneurship and the Process of Development:  A Framework for Applied 
Expeditionary Economics in Pakistan,” Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, February 2012, 33–34, for an 
explanation of factor analysis and its use in this setting. 
21 This information will be augmented by other data taken from the World Bank Development 
Indicators, Human Development Indicators, Doing Business variables and other data sets as required, and 
will be further explained in Chapter II. 
22 This is merely an example provided for illustrative purposes, and is not meant to imply that this will 
actually be derived as stated. 
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components of all data sets examined fit into, and which factors the intermediate 
variables of Growth and Entrepreneurship are most closely associated with.  The result of 
this analysis is that the factors that are actually measuring performance of metrics that are 
highly associated with the dependent variables will be identified for the specific group of 
countries of interest in a particular portion of the study.   
While the determination of categories will be the result of rigorous statistical 
analysis using the appropriate software, the titling of the categories determined will 
largely be an exercise in common sense.  In other words, after looking through the 
variables determined to be in the same category, they will then be titled based upon what 
the preponderance of factors were originally named, and what the sum of the variables 
seem to indicate is being measured.  Combining the results from the two analyses, the 
factors most important to economic growth, creation of a positive entrepreneurial 
environment and advancement in economic stage can be determined.   
Finally, the empirical data representing the identified critical factors, taken from 
these economic and governmental performance data sets, will be examined for each 
country, and will then be compared to the mean values of groups of countries similar in a 
particular aspect of development to the country being studied.  In general, these groups 
are the group of countries in the MENA region, due to the similarities in culture, religion 
and factor endowments, and the group of countries identified by the World Economic 
Forum as being in the same stage of development as the countries of interest.  Each 
country will be considered separately, and will not be compared to one another outside of 
the fact that they will contribute to the mean value of the MENA group, and potentially to 
the development stage group as well.23  This comparison will provide the ultimate 
result—which areas, identified as critical and strongly influenced by governmental 
policies and structures, require improvement in order for each country to grow 
economically, to move to the next stage of development and to create a positive 
                                                 
23 According to the World Economic Forum’s classification system, Libya and Egypt are both in the 
group of countries in transition from factor-driven to efficiency-driven economies, while Tunisia is in the 
group of countries identified as efficiency-driven. Therefore, Tunisia will not be included in the 
comparison of Libya or Egypt versus countries at a similar development stage, though the latter two will be 
included in the data for the other’s analysis. 
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entrepreneurial environment.24  Identification of these critical factors in which each 
country must improve will provide country-specific focus areas to a literature that largely 
lacks empirical rigor for the solutions advanced. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
As generally described above, the analysis produced in this paper will be 
conducted in three separate steps.  First, a general assessment of the effectiveness of each 
pre-revolution government will be provided.  This portion of the analysis will be 
executed with the least rigor, and is included only to determine a baseline for the analysis 
to follow.  The main two sections will be accomplished by addressing five questions. The 
answers found will provide the evidence required to answer the research question as 
applied to the specific circumstances of each country.  The first four questions comprise 
the second portion of the analysis and will determine the critical areas of pre-revolution 
government ineptitude.  These are: (1) which factors are most important in creating 
economic growth for each country based upon its stage of development?  (2) Which areas 
are the most important to fostering an environment conducive to entrepreneurship for 
each country based on its development stage?  (3) Which factors are the most important 
to economic stage advancement for each country based on its current development stage?   
Finally, (4) in which of these identified areas of importance did the pre-revolution 
governments underperform as compared to countries at a similar stage of development 
and/or regional associational group?  This will provide a roadmap of key areas for the 
incoming governments of each country to focus upon in order to spur economic growth 
and facilitate entrepreneurial-based remedies to economic issues in the post-revolution 
states. 
The final stage of the analysis will assess the recent condition of each area 
identified as lacking in order to create a logic explaining the poor performance of each 
                                                 
24 For example, the factor analysis for Egypt might find that 11 different variables from the combined 
data set are measuring governmental performance in some way. The discriminant analysis might find four 
different factors identified as critical for advancement from Group 2 (Egypt’s current WEF classification) 
to Group 3. Of these four critical factors, two of them are among the 11 that are measuring government. 
These two factors can then be compared to other groups and potentially be identified as areas upon which 
the new government should focus, should they be found to be underperforming, or even performing in-line 
with similar countries. 
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economy.  This will ultimately find an answer to: (5) based on an assessment of pre-
revolution government performance in the identified critical fields, how did these 
variables interrelate to form vicious cycles of economic ineptitude?   While the veracity 
and sourcing of the numbers that will be relied upon is contentious and undoubtedly tell 
only a portion of the story, these are the best sources of information available and are 
used extensively throughout economic research.  Use of these datasets is only one method 
of producing evidence identifying critical governmental focus areas, but is required for 
the form of analysis upon which this paper will rely.   
The first portion of the analysis will, through a comparison of “expectation 
metrics” such as per capita GDP and foreign aid via direct investment with measurements 
of human development described by education, infrastructure and healthcare metrics, 
determine a baseline of pre-revolution governmental performance.  The validity of the 
results produced by an analysis such as this is somewhat dependent upon the degree to 
which the unique circumstances of a country are manifest within the numbers used.  
While this is a matter of debate, it is my contention that the macroeconomic metrics 
indicating the level of advancement a country should have, when viewed over time, 
encapsulate the historical circumstances unique to that country, and are conveyed therein.  
Therefore, if compared to the more pragmatic assessments of the conditions of the 
populace within a country (described by human development metrics), a general picture 
of the effectiveness of government—complete with context unique to that country—is 
revealed. 
The next portion of this study will be accomplished by conducting an analysis 
comparing the performance of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt in key metrics to the average 
performance of countries in the same region as well as those at the same stage of 
development. To achieve this, the results of the factor and discriminant analyses of the 
development groupings in which each country is a member will be utilized to determine 
the metrics upon which a comparison should be made.  These metrics are thereby specific 
to each country based upon its development level.  To identify particular areas in which 
the pre-revolution governments inhibited progress, the relative strength in indicators that 
showed strong associational links with growth, entrepreneurship or stage advancement 
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compared to similarly developed economies as well as regional competitors will be 
determined.  From this analysis, the particular areas of governance and policy that were 
limiting in each country will be derived, which will ultimately provide areas of focus for 
both the incoming governments and the international community in an attempt to increase 
prosperity through the fostering of firm creation and growth within each country.  
Finally, an evaluation of the condition of each identified area of underperformance in the 
pre-Arab Spring environment will be conducted.  This brief examination of the factors 
found to have been most constraining will ultimately illuminate each country’s economic 
vicious cycle, and will depict the areas in which improvement may transform that cycle 
into a virtuous one.  
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The results from the empirical analysis contained in this chapter will provide 
answers to the following questions:  which factors are most relevant to improving 
economic growth at each development stage?  Which factors are most relevant to 
fostering entrepreneurship in each stage of development?  And most pertinently, which 
variables are most relevant in facilitating economic advancement to a more progressive 
stage of development?  All results established in this chapter are general conclusions that 
are applicable to any developing country.  The specific analysis of the three countries to 
be investigated in this paper will be executed using the results from the general study 
contained herein. 
In order to ensure the context of this chapter is understood, the method whereby 
the results from this chapter will be used to produce conclusions of value regarding the 
particular cases of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt will be briefly outlined.  First, subsequent 
chapters will analyze the performance of each North African country being studied in the 
areas determined to be significant via the data derived from this analysis.  The specific 
areas that are both essential for economic advancement and that were being poorly 
executed by the pre-Arab Spring regimes in each country will then be identified.  
Through this process, a prioritization of crucial factors demanding improvement that is 
tailored to the particular country being studied will emerge.  Finally, the identified key 
factors will be briefly examined within the context of each country’s particular pre-Arab 
Spring structures.  These are presumed to in large part be the consequence of 
governmental policies and their execution, and are therefore within the purview of 
incoming governments to change.  The ultimate goal is to elucidate not only the key 
factors wherein improvement will most likely result in economic improvement, but also 
to provide explanation regarding the manifestation of vicious cycles that have inhibited 
economic growth and advancement in each case.  
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B. EXPLANATION OF DATASET 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) provides an efficient and useful method of 
categorizing countries via economic development stage that will be used in this thesis.  In 
this system, there are three classifications of economies (factor driven, efficiency driven 
and innovation driven) with two intermediate stages for economies in transition from one 
stage to another.  There are two criteria used to determine each country’s stage of 
development. 
The first is the level of GDP per capita at market exchange rates. This 
widely available measure is used as a proxy for wages, because 
internationally comparable data on wages are not available for all 
countries covered…A second criterion measures the extent to which 
countries are factor driven. This is measured by the share of exports of 
mineral goods in total exports (goods and services), assuming that 
countries that export more than 70 percent of mineral products (measured 
using a five year average) are to a large extent factor driven.25 
The actual levels of per capita income used to classify each country are shown in Table 1.   
However, since the dataset being used in this paper (which will be more thoroughly 
examined in the following paragraphs) consists of only developing economies, there are 
very few stage 3 economies included in the study.  Moreover, the goal of the study is to 
determine areas most significant in constraining the economies of three countries that are 
either in transition from stage 1 to 2 or in stage 2.  Therefore, all countries analyzed 
through this model must pass through the transition phase before reaching stage 3.  Thus, 
economies that are either in transition from stage 2 to 3 or in stage 3 have been combined 
into a single group.  This results in the final grouping of countries used in this study, with 
the first three groups mirroring the stage 1, transition from stage 1 to 2 and stage 2 
construct of the WEF, and the final group entailing all remaining countries.  It is also 
important to note that the extent to which a country is factor driven can significantly 
influence categorization of the income groupings represented in Table 1.  For example, 
Libya maintained a per capita income on the high end of the transition between  
stage 2 and 3 (approximately $13,000–$16,000 over the last few years of the Qadhafi 
                                                 
25 Xavier Sala-I-Martin et.al., The Global Competitiveness Report, 2010–2011, ed. Klaus Schaub 
(Geneva:  World Economic Forum, 2010), 10. 
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regime) but is classified as a country in transition from stage 1 to 2 due to its almost 
exclusive reliance upon factor endowments.26 
Table 1.   Income Requirements by Economic Development Stage   
 
 
To conduct the study, four datasets were combined with data from 102 developing 
countries.  The 12 pillars of competitiveness used by the WEF, the six World Bank 
Governance Indicators (WB), the 11 dimensions of Economic Freedom in Heritage 
House’s Index of Economic Freedom (HH) and the 17 criteria for political and economic 
transformation measured by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) were merged 
into a single database.  However, since the goal of the study is to determine focus areas 
that were most responsible for constraining these economies by the pre-revolution 
governments, great care was taken to use the most recent data available while ensuring 
data reflecting post-Arab Spring environments was avoided.  For example, the most 
recent iteration of the Global Competitiveness Report was rejected in favor of the  
2010–2011 version, since although the statistical data used by the 2011–2012 report  
dates to 2010 or earlier, “the Executive Opinion Survey…which includes the remaining 
data, was carried out between February and May 2011 and captures the turbulence and 




                                                 
26 Data from World Bank Development Indicators (accessed May 9, 2012), 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog . 
27 Xavier Sala-I-Martin, et.al, The Global Competitiveness Report, 2011–2012, ed. Klaus Schaub 
(Geneva:  World Economic Forum, 2011), 37. 
Stage of Development GDP per capita (in US$) 
Stage 1: Factor driven        < 2,000 
Transition from stage 1 to stage 2              2,000–3,000 
Stage 2: Efficiency driven                           3,000–9,000 
Transition from stage 2 to stage 3              9,000–17,000 
Stage 3: Innovation driven >17,000 
Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report, 2010‐2011. 
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of the BTI states that “the overwhelming majority of the social and political upheavals in 
the Arab world took place after the close of the period under review,” thus explaining the 
utilization of this more recent publication.28  
The 102 countries chosen for the study were selected pragmatically.  The first 
criterion for selection required that the economy of the country be considered to still be 
developing, rather than mature.  The second criterion demanded that there be data 
available for the country in each of the 4 data sets.  Inclusion of the BTI in the study 
effectively ensured the first criterion was met.  This is because it is an index designed to 
determine the effectiveness of governments in transforming developing economies into 
modern, mature ones, thus omitting all countries “in which economic development can be 
regarded as well-advanced.”29  After omitting all countries included in the BTI that were 
not represented in at least one of the other three datasets (in accordance with the second 
criterion), the 102 country list emerged, with classifications as shown in Table 2.  
Two dependent (or in the ultimate structure of this research, intermediate) 
variables have been included in the dataset with the 46 independent variables.  Each of 
these metrics is an evaluation of a government’s performance in two key areas of the 
study:  the effectiveness of governmental policy in spurring growth and the effectiveness 
of governmental policy in fostering entrepreneurship.  Their inclusion was necessary to 
determine which group of factors representing variance in a particular phenomenon each 
most closely associates with.  This determination will provide an answer to the question 
of which factors are most closely linked to a country’s performance in each of these 
variables.  While not adequately descriptive to relate the sense of this point, for brevity 




                                                 
28 Transformation Index BTI 2012:  Political Management in International Comparison, ed. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gutersloh, 2012), 16. 
29 Transformation Index BTI website, http://www.bti-project.org/index/methodology/ (accessed June 
1, 2012). 
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Table 2.   List of Countries in Study by Group 
 
 
Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
Bangladesh  Algeria  Albania  Bahrain 
Benin  Angola  Argentina  Chile 
Bolivia  Armenia  Bosnia and Herzegovina  Croatia 
Burkina Faso  Azerbaijan Brazil Czech Republic 
Burundi  Botswana  Bulgaria  Estonia 
Cambodia  Egypt  China  Hungary 
Cameroon  Georgia  Colombia Latvia 
Chad  Guatemala  Costa Rica  Lithuania 
Cote d’Ivoire  Indonesia  Dominican Republic  Oman 
Ethiopia  Iran  Ecuador  Poland 
Ghana  Jamaica  El Salvador Singapore 
Honduras  Kazakhstan  Jordan  Slovenia 
India  Kuwait  Lebanon  South Korea 
Kenya  Libya  Macedonia  Taiwan 
Kyrgyzstan  Morocco  Malaysia  United Arab Emirates 
Lesotho  Paraguay  Mauritius  Uruguay 
Madagascar  Qatar  Mexico   
Malawi  Saudi Arabia Montenegro
Mali  Sri Lanka  Namibia   
Mauritania  Syria  Panama   
Moldova  Ukraine  Peru   
Mongolia  Venezuela Romania
Mozambique    Russia   
Nepal    Serbia   
Nicaragua    South Africa   
Nigeria    Thailand
Pakistan    Tunisia   
Philippines    Turkey   
Rwanda       
Senegal       
Tajikistan       
Tanzania       
Uganda   





The Entrepreneurship variable equates to each country’s value in the Ease of 
Doing Business (EDB) 2011 overall ranking. The reasoning behind equating EDB with a 
positive environment for entrepreneurial activity is quite straightforward.  Put simply, “a 
high ranking on the ease of doing business index means the regulatory environment is 
more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm.”30  Creation of such 
conditions is largely synonymous with a positive entrepreneurial environment.  While 
this does not necessarily equate to increased entrepreneurial activity, the variable is 
intended to reflect the performance of the government in creating the proper 
environment, rather than the effectiveness of potential entrepreneurs in taking advantage 
of it.   
The values for the Growth variable were determined through finding each 
country’s mean GDP growth per capita (annual %) for the period of 2001–2010.31  Since 
developing economies in general have higher growth rates than more mature economies, 
the inclusion of only less economically developed countries (as mandated through using 
only countries contained  in the BTI) was necessary to ensure an “apples to apples” 
comparison to the greatest extent possible.  Although actual calculations of real economic 
growth require more complexity than this variable provides, it is deemed to suffice for 
the purposes of this study.  This is because the associations this variable (as calculated 
herein) exhibits will help to indicate which of the independent variables are most closely 
related to growth at various stages of development, which satisfies its function in the 
analysis. 
                                                 
30 Ease of Doing Business, Rankings, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. One of the countries 
being studied in this paper (Libya) is not included in the Ease of Doing Business rankings due to lack of 
data. However, this omission does not significantly detract from the results, as they are intended to provide 
general trends and associations amongst variables, and the data of one country (regardless of its importance 
in this study) is not likely to appreciably change those associations. 
31 The decision to take an average value for growth stems from the clearer picture it will provide in 
terms of the effectiveness of policy decisions that may not produce results immediately. Moreover, the 
decade-long time period of data more precisely reflects growth performance which can vary greatly from 
year to year. Data was taken from World Bank Development Indicators (accessed May 11, 2012), 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog. All countries’ data was averaged for the number of years available, 
if no data was available for all 10 years included in the analysis. 
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C. FACTOR ASSOCIATIONS AMONG VARIABLES 
The first stage of the analysis required that the 48 variables in the study be 
reduced to determine their principal components.  To that end, a statistical method of data 
reduction was executed to extract components of the dataset which are measuring a 
country’s performance in largely the same element.  The method of data reduction 
executed (factor analysis) provides a technique for answering the following two 
questions:  (1) “how many distinct phenomena are represented” by the combined 
dataset?32  And (2) which of the independent variables are most closely associated with 
the “Growth” and “Entrepreneurship” variables.33  Moreover, as similar analyses can be 
conducted for each group or combination of groups, associational trends as economies 
advance can be established through this methodology, and thus can help to determine 
tendencies regarding which factors are most important depending on development level. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the factor analysis undertaken for the dataset, 
inclusive of all country groupings.  There were seven components identified, of which 
Entrepreneurship was most closely associated with the component labeled “Legal 
System/Markets/Institutions.”  The implication of this result is that a positive 
entrepreneurial environment requires a solid legal foundation including control of and 
freedom from corruption, strong property rights and good quality of regulations.  Other 
factors such as effectiveness of government, sophistication of business and innovation are 
also associated with the “Entrepreneurship” variable.  To a lesser degree, economic 
freedoms illustrated by several variables in the Heritage House dataset including 
Business Freedom were also associated with a positive environment for entrepreneurship. 
 
 
                                                 
32 Looney, “Entrepreneurship and the Process of Development,” 21. 
33 Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, “A Factor Analysis of the Interrelationship Between Social 
and Political Variables and Per Capita Gross National Product,” in Quarterly Journal of Economics 79, no. 
4 (November 1965), 555–578, should be consulted for an explanation of factor analysis and interpretation 
of its results. 
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BTI Polit. Participation  .962  ‐.099 .033 ‐.007 ‐.027  ‐.019  ‐.069
BTI Stab. of Dem. Inst.  .961  ‐.036 .069 .003 ‐.045  ‐.019  ‐.050
WB Voice & Account.  .949  .113 .127 .055 ‐.034  .044  ‐.064
BTI  Pol. & Social Int.  .931  .030 .127 ‐.001 ‐.097  ‐.026  ‐.107
BTI Rule of Law  .917  .192 .175 .102 ‐.071  .057  ‐.015
BTI Consensus‐Blding  .912  .160 .136 .020 .051  .168  .007
BTI Steering Capability  .859  .224 .199 .088 .057  .116  .116
BTI Int’l. Cooperation  .759  .378 .081 .129 .232  .193  .167
BTI Private Property  .676  .472 .331 .322 .034  .008  .073
BTIOrg.of Mkt&Comp.  .674  .452 .375 .290 .033  ‐.014  .109
HH Invst. Freedom  .637  .292 ‐.033 .535 .088  ‐.013  .054
BTI ResourceEfficiency  .610  .539 .332 .131 .056  .275  .090
BTI Stateness  .578  .224 .372 .014 ‐.147  .480  .214
BTI Curr. &Price Stab.  .571  .348 .282 .316 .312  .200  .097
BTIMgmt.Lev of Diff.  .536  .268 .683 .229 ‐.151  .189  .021
WEF Institutions  ‐.096  .877 .171 .112 .026  .242  .040
WEFGoodsMktEfficy  .037  .840 .280 .256 .182  ‐.003  .011
HH Freedm from Corr.  .321  .781 .315 .190 ‐.018  .266  ‐.081
WB Control of Corr.  .350  .761 .238 .203 ‐.023  .299  ‐.102
HH Property Rights  .420  .745 .215 .222 .043  .089  ‐.047
WEF Innovation  .065  .736 .478 ‐.207 .146  .050  .079
WEFFinancialMkt Dev.  .202  .733 .249 .096 .194  ‐.215  .034
WB Rule of Law  .402  .728 .344 .186 .011  .225  .039
WB Govt.Effectiveness  .362  .706 .479 .203 .026  .120  .042
WEF Bus. Sophist.  .097  .692 .556 ‐.016 .272  ‐.138  ‐.064
Entrepreneurship  .194  .599 .391 .471 ‐.025  ‐.110  .226
WB Regul. Quality  .535  .588 .308 .438 .107  .034  .136
WEF Hig Educ. & Trng  .240  .408 .806 .165 ‐.097  .018  .061
WEFHealth& Pri.Educ.  .080  .197 .805 .306 ‐.007  .050  ‐.017
WEF Market Size  ‐.040  .102 .698 ‐.316 .356  ‐.310  .077
WEF Infrastructure  .080  .607 .678 .200 .052  .103  ‐.033
WEF Tech. Readiness  .245  .558 .677 .238 .029  .094  ‐.010
WEF Macro. Envir.  ‐.024  .320 .495 .158 .407  .299  .065
BTI Lev. Socioec Dev..  .345  .311 .774 .164 ‐.115  .140  .036
BTI Welfare Regime  .465  .379 .631 .145 ‐.131  .300  .091
BTI Sustainability  .516  .392 .620 .109 ‐.144  .105  .146
BTI Econ.Perform.  .346  .396 .487 ‐.078 .451  .257  .132
HH Fiscal Freedom  ‐.226  .071 .210 .678 .078  .103  ‐.035
HH Overall Score  .368  .581 .157 .624 .257  .033  .143
HH Trade Freedom  .420  .182 .205 .612 .093  .246  .156
HH Financial Freedom  .490  .280 .062 .615 .139  ‐.041  .066
HH Business Freedom  .125  .442 .346 .521 ‐.061  ‐.166  .117
HH Gov’t Spending  ‐.221  .076 ‐.128 .085 .767  ‐.187  ‐.026
HH MonetaryFreedom  .325  .155 .008 .411 .600  .144  .207
WB Political Stability  .407  .447 .183 .140 ‐.097  .644  .114
Growth  ‐.029  ‐.238 .120 ‐.019 .164  .028  .820
WEFLbrMkt. Efficiency  .029  .572 ‐.006 .240 ‐.039  .166  .630







The “Growth” variable demonstrated a strong link to the status of the labor 
market in an economy, both its efficiency and the freedom businesses possess in its 
application.  Moreover, these were the only other variables present in the extracted 
component, which may suggest a profound link between labor markets and growth.  
Unlike Entrepreneurship, the Growth variable did not exhibit even a remotely significant 
connection to any other component, again reinforcing the relationship between labor 
markets and Growth. 
Factor analyses were also executed for separate country groups.   While each 
country in the group is at an approximately equivalent level of development, it is 
presumed that those countries that have been performing most competently with respect 
to increasing growth and creating a more positive entrepreneurial environment will 
advance to progressively more advanced groups more quickly.34  Thus, identifying the 
factors most closely associated with the “Growth” and “Entrepreneurship” variables will 
indicate the areas upon which a government should focus, should performance in those 
areas be found to require improvement.  To this end, factor analyses comprising of only 
Group 2 countries as well as analyses consisting of only Group 3 and Group 4 countries 
were conducted.  Since all three of the countries in this study are at least at the Group 2 
level (with Tunisia being a member of Group 3), an analysis comprising of only Group 1 
countries was deemed to be irrelevant.  The logic of this conclusion rests in that the goal 
of the study is to find focus areas necessary for progression to a more advanced stage, 
rather than guarding against a regression to a less advanced stage of development.  Thus, 
the effort of the study concentrated on finding both the most critical factors for the stage a 





                                                 
34 Collier and Dollar, “Can the World Cut Poverty in Half?,” 1787. 
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WEF Institutions  .870  ‐.157 .077 .361 .003 .138  .074  .038
WB Control of Corr.  .855  .134 .229 .282 .241 ‐.152  .002  .055
WB Rule of Law  .845  .028 .293 .292 .155 .023  .036  .019
HH Freedm from Corr.  .835  .081 .265 .292 .230 ‐.026  .065  .037
HH Property Rights  .803  .237 .404 .217 .170 ‐.034  .156  ‐.020
WB Gov’tEffectiveness  .789  .199 .219 .334 .213 .076  ‐.233  .070
BTI ResourceEfficiency  .630  .400 .400 .061 .254 .143  .126  .091
WEF Goods Mkt. Eff.  .629  .026 .322 .609 ‐.128 .106  .119  .211
BTI Stability of Dem.  ‐.025  .963 .072 ‐.061 .026 ‐.040  ‐.036  ‐.024
BTI Polit.Participation  ‐.015  .954 .081 ‐.129 .103 ‐.024  ‐.039  ‐.079
WB Voice & Account.  .023  .936 .163 .004 .202 ‐.080  ‐.042  ‐.047
BTI Pol. and Social Int.  ‐.091  .893 .116 ‐.119 .036 ‐.078  .003  ‐.124
BTI Rule of Law  .186  .875 .265 ‐.037 .127 .052  ‐.049  .048
BTI ConsensusBuilding  .285  .823 .352 ‐.070 .115 ‐.061  .117  .050
BTI Steering Capability  .255  .799 .375 .036 .045 .189  .148  .055
BTI Int’l Cooperation  .300  .620 .553 .166 .182 .165  .298  .115
HH Financial Freedom  .309  .376 .829 ‐.083 .053 .028  ‐.080  .035
HHInvestmntFreedom  .218  .417 .803 ‐.116 ‐.063 ‐.038  ‐.147  .067
HH Trade Freedom  .074  .213 .762 .131 .075 .274  .184  .034
HH Overall Score  .516  .219 .733 .151 .027 .193  ‐.126  .254
WB Regulatory Quality  .487  .325 .726 .261 .083 .151  ‐.075  .030
Entrepreneurship  .490  ‐.029 .636 .304 .072 .331  ‐.243  .183
BTI Private Property  .497  .385 .589 .275 .215 .118  ‐.012  .006
BTI Org. Mkt. & Comp.  .423  .414 .549 .407 .213 .154  .056  ‐.090
WEF Market Size  ‐.125  ‐.377 ‐.527 .456 ‐.194 ‐.142  .262  ‐.194
BTI Curr. &Price Stab.  .432  .351 .518 .049 ‐.045 .157  .471  .258
WEF Bus. Sophis.  .354  ‐.088 .153 .859 ‐.096 ‐.051  .195  .191
WEF High Ed. & Trning  .115  ‐.050 ‐.072 .851 .384 .141  ‐.166  ‐.023
WEF Innovation  .394  ‐.056 ‐.074 .841 .057 .097  .216  ‐.018
WEF Tech. Readiness  .284  ‐.179 .254 .807 .221 ‐.105  ‐.022  .000
WEF Infrastructure  .455  ‐.156 .210 .803 .079 .043  ‐.145  ‐.015
WEF Health&Pri.Educ.  .097  ‐.100 ‐.155 .701 .090 .007  ‐.312  .402
WEF FinancialMktDev.  .419  .235 .464 .622 ‐.014 ‐.115  .113  .145
BTI Welfare Regime  .196  .082 ‐.040 .145 .877 .133  .191  ‐.069
BTI Mgmt. Lev of Diff.  .194  .117 .171 .290 .809 .035  ‐.280  ‐.146
BTI Stateness  ‐.006  .358 .212 ‐.269 .779 .033  .127  ‐.161
BTI Lev.SocioeconDev.  .204  .058 ‐.235 .459 .672 .038  .051  .261
BTI Sustainability  .437  .340 .180 .133 .608 .257  ‐.132  ‐.063
WB Political Stability  .490  .026 .476 .032 .555 .259  .283  ‐.089
Growth  ‐.309  ‐.162 .118 ‐.262 .113 .764  .040  ‐.022
WEFLabMkt.Efficiency  .268  .149 .439 .202 .313 .703  .150  .006
HH Labor Freedom  .313  ‐.059 .300 .231 .128 .703  ‐.282  ‐.024
BTI Econ.Performance  .519  ‐.034 .054 .143 .128 .034  .727  .193
HH Business Freedom  .391  ‐.019 .393 .236 ‐.050 .246  ‐.666  .126
HH Gov’t Spending  ‐.071  ‐.076 .146 .202 ‐.275 ‐.158  ‐.002  .832
HH MonetaryFreedom  .229  .394 .426 ‐.101 ‐.250 .261  ‐.013  .549
WEFMacroecon.Enviro .253  ‐.418 .077 .246 .171 .085  .289  .536







Table 4 shows the factor associations present when only Group 2 countries are 
considered.  Consistent with the factor analysis comprising all countries, Growth is 
predominantly associated with labor market efficiency and labor freedom.  The 
Entrepreneurship variable now has slightly more association with economic freedom and 
regulation and organization of markets than with corruption and institutional 
effectiveness when compared to the analysis inclusive of all countries.  However, the link 
with corruption and effectiveness of government remains relatively strong, if now 
secondary. 
When only Group 3 countries are considered, Entrepreneurship is most correlated 
with only two variables: business freedom and the macroeconomic environment.  This is 
a significant change from the previous two analyses, though there is still some association 
with the Corruption/Government Effectiveness component consistent with the previous 
results.  The Growth factor maintains its strong relationship with efficiency of the labor 
market, but is no longer associated with labor freedom as it was with the analyses 
consisting of the total sample of countries and of only Group 2 countries.  Once again, 
there are no statistically significant relationships between Growth and any other extracted 
component, or the variables contained therein.  
The results of the Group 4 only analysis are substantially more ambiguous and 
somewhat less satisfying than the previous three.  Growth is associated with half of the 
46 total factors in the study, detracting from the value of the factor analysis, as one of its 
functions is to find the areas wherein improvement will likely increase economic growth.  
Not inconsistent with logic or intuition, more advanced economies appear to grow most 
efficiently when experiencing an overall improvement in most areas, most significantly 
the strength of democratic processes and several of the economic freedoms measured by 
Heritage House.  Entrepreneurship is most appreciably correlated with the efficiency of 
the labor markets at this level of development, as well as the sophistication of, quality of 
the regulation of, and freedom provided to the country’s businesses.  Hence, again 
consistent with logic, a positive entrepreneurial environment is correlated with business-
centric metrics, as well as labor market efficiency. 
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BTIConsensusBuilding  .962  .146  .065 .034 .001 .053 ‐.022  ‐.011  .090
BTI Political Part.  .907  ‐.233  .146 ‐.156 ‐.067 ‐.193 ‐.111  .003  ‐.018
BTI Pol. & Soc. Int.  .904  ‐.052  .192 .037 ‐.009 ‐.224 ‐.092  ‐.093  ‐.012
WB Voice & Account.  .900  ‐.023  .194 ‐.090 .032 ‐.226 ‐.119  .004  ‐.038
BTI Stab. Dem. Inst.  .890  ‐.204  .233 ‐.140 .025 ‐.122 ‐.036  ‐.015  .057
BTI Rule of Law  .882  .056  .281 .004 ‐.104 ‐.134 ‐.047  .112  ‐.150
BTISteeringCapability  .855  .127  .275 ‐.136 .054 .041 .152  ‐.076  .044
BTI Mgmt Lev. Diff.  .844  .019  ‐.031 .421 ‐.034 ‐.089 ‐.117  .051  ‐.009
BTI Stateness  .768  .196  ‐.193 .257 .123 .429 ‐.032  .021  ‐.046
BTI Resource Eff.  .658  .568  .012 .059 ‐.025 .055 .194  .075  ‐.092
BTI Int’ lCooperation  .638  .348  .405 ‐.082 ‐.117 .200 ‐.025  ‐.181  .270
WB Political Stability  .604  .468  ‐.220 ‐.033 ‐.027 .181 ‐.420  .151  .120
BTI Welfare Regime  .604  .447  ‐.065 .498 .056 ‐.057 .067  .269  ‐.088
BTI Org Mkt & Comp.  .602  .178  .674 ‐.018 ‐.059 .105 .182  .056  .026
BTI Sustainability  .583  .402  .024 .315 ‐.011 .217 .387  .021  ‐.278
WEF Institutions  ‐.185  .893  ‐.041 ‐.012 .107 .133 ‐.245  .098  .064
HHFreedm from Corr.  .250  .891  .221 ‐.015 .034 ‐.009 ‐.060  .025  ‐.173
WB Rule of Law  .243  .865  .130 .220 .069 ‐.004 ‐.054  .107  ‐.129
WB Gov’t Effect.  .121  .830  .118 .194 .309 ‐.039 .150  ‐.138  .053
WB Control of Corr.  .447  .790  .227 ‐.011 ‐.004 ‐.105 ‐.017  .079  ‐.235
WEF Goods Mkt. Eff.  ‐.195  .732  .385 .053 .202 .169 ‐.208  ‐.086  .148
WEFFinancialMktDev.  .002  .721  .246 ‐.188 .214 .042 .000  ‐.029  .300
HH Property Rights  .142  .698  .362 .131 .119 ‐.419 .140  ‐.066  .056
WEF Bus. Sophist.  ‐.110  .696  .061 .174 .027 ‐.058 .220  ‐.433  .356
WEF Innovation  ‐.137  .696  ‐.303 .380 .060 .154 .335  .024  .267
WEF Infrastructure  ‐.207  .631  ‐.176 .044 .317 .084 .301  .024  .143
HH Finan. Freedom  .102  ‐.033  .800 ‐.053 .239 ‐.237 ‐.051  .037  ‐.023
HH Overall Score  .206  .432  .753 ‐.021 .338 ‐.144 ‐.159  ‐.042  ‐.054
HH Invest Freedom  .422  .097  .739 ‐.005 ‐.018 ‐.183 ‐.253  ‐.088  ‐.219
WB Reg. Quality  .314  .507  .720 .104 .227 .036 .087  ‐.003  .025
HHMonetaryFreedm  ‐.192  .205  .720 ‐.060 .042 .145 ‐.253  .029  .272
BTI Curr. & PriceStab.  .296  .081  .673 ‐.130 ‐.176 ‐.047 .313  .227  .229
BTI Private Property  .519  .373  .634 .118 ‐.028 ‐.052 ‐.024  ‐.042  .006
HH Trade Freedom  .456  ‐.052  .605 ‐.210 .021 .171 ‐.209  .086  ‐.314
HH Fiscal Freedom  .021  ‐.176  .580 .360 ‐.072 .029 ‐.567  .125  ‐.057
WEFHigherEd.& Trng.  ‐.190  .270  ‐.125 .836 ‐.104 ‐.055 .121  .032  .147
WEF Health & Pri. Ed.  ‐.166  .042  ‐.001 .813 ‐.111 .201 ‐.150  ‐.010  ‐.029
BTI Lev. of Socio Dev.  .409  ‐.020  .043 .788 .175 .077 .139  .085  ‐.097
WEF Tech. Readiness  .278  .474  .145 .496 .195 .055 ‐.003  .011  .444
Entrepreneurship  ‐.055  .425  .286 .062 .769 ‐.028 .034  .074  .003
HH Bus. Freedom  .101  .303  .297 ‐.021 .723 ‐.314 ‐.088  ‐.002  ‐.016
WEF MacroEnvirnmt  ‐.169  .212  ‐.306 ‐.159 .647 .436 .124  ‐.036  .054
Growth  ‐.299  ‐.139  ‐.124 .196 ‐.120 .815 .041  ‐.049  ‐.058
WEF Labor Mkt. Eff.  ‐.047  .347  .270 .148 .241 .515 .064  .411  .209
WEF Market Size  ‐.231  ‐.051  ‐.231 .125 .019 .128 .836  ‐.294  .035
HH Labor Freedom  ‐.031  .306  .224 .033 .297 .090 ‐.116  .722  .095
HH Gov’t. Spending  ‐.086  .257  .080 ‐.173 .349 .073 .171  ‐.694  .074






























BTI Stab. of Dem. Inst.  .985  .012 ‐.021 .006 .037 .011  .163  .009
BTI Steering Cap.  .975  .097 ‐.061 ‐.066 ‐.037 ‐.063  .019  .120
BTI Pol. Participation  .971  ‐.055 ‐.043 ‐.009 .084 .135  .151  ‐.055
BTI Rule of Law  .971  .138 ‐.048 .136 .063 .037  .104  ‐.033
BTI ConsensusBuilding  .963  .011 ‐.171 .025 ‐.034 .054  .096  .154
WB Voice and Account  .959  .070 .004 .074 .113 .149  .118  ‐.147
BTI Private Property  .930  .116 .222 .112 .184 .084  .076  ‐.104
BTI Mgmt. Lev. Of Diff.  .924  .013 .010 .141 .206 .218  .056  ‐.133
BTI Stateness  .922  .024 ‐.065 ‐.145 .059 .249  .041  ‐.117
BTI Int’l Cooperation  .905  .210 ‐.054 ‐.035 ‐.109 ‐.316  .092  .101
BTI ResourceEfficiency  .883  .408 .019 .008 ‐.007 .083  ‐.004  .204
BTI Pol. and Social Int.  .881  .092 ‐.229 .347 ‐.024 .147  .081  ‐.118
WEF Macroecon. Env.  ‐.775  .301 .352 ‐.119 ‐.088 ‐.032  .249  .280
BTI Org.ofMkt.&Comp.  .773  ‐.016 .330 .305 .194 .095  .310  ‐.239
BTI Sustainability  .764  ‐.377 .100 .466 ‐.073 .192  .066  ‐.016
BTI Welfare Regime  .743  .116 ‐.224 .164 .032 .551  ‐.023  .084
Growth  .732  ‐.237 .329 ‐.267 ‐.055 .079  ‐.136  .447
HH Labor Freedom  ‐.710  .471 .017 ‐.061 .070 ‐.196  ‐.401  ‐.257
HH Fiscal Freedom  ‐.659  .197 .096 ‐.009 ‐.334 ‐.342  ‐.462  .267
WEF Higher Ed.& Trng.  .640  .057 .535 .474 .088 .136  ‐.206  .032
HH Invest. Freedom  .627  .250 .259 .379 ‐.494 ‐.091  .062  ‐.280
HH Trade Freedom  .601  ‐.317 .420 ‐.092 .188 .123  .548  ‐.022
WEF Fin. Mkt. Dev.  ‐.599  .562 .234 .179 .366 ‐.157  .032  .100
WB Political Stability  .595  .030 ‐.222 ‐.431 .342 .460  ‐.031  .278
HH FreedomfromCorr. .210 .948 ‐.006 ‐.090 ‐.130 .103 ‐.071 ‐.037
WB Control of Corr.  .391  .888 ‐.118 ‐.160 ‐.011 ‐.073  .045  ‐.111
HH Property Rights  .352  .845 .286 .124 .019 .097  .066  ‐.224
WEF Institutions  ‐.464  .809 .085 ‐.118 ‐.104 ‐.130  ‐.126  .213
BTI Economic Perf.  .047  .775 ‐.168 .153 .481 .211  ‐.088  .113
HH Overall Score  ‐.203  .765 .413 .194 ‐.277 ‐.222  ‐.058  ‐.098
BTI Curr. & Price Stab.  .105  .717 .047 .432 .038 ‐.327  .256  .276
WB Rule of Law  .433  .625 .552 ‐.282 ‐.004 .031  .044  ‐.157
WEF Goods Mkt. Eff.  ‐.589  .611 .442 .094 .056 ‐.218  ‐.024  .020
WB Gov’tEffectiveness  .434  .595 .452 ‐.017 ‐.132 .010  .460  .009
Entrepreneurship .000 ‐.035 .951 ‐.028 ‐.231 ‐.192 ‐.034 ‐.047
WEF Labor Mkt. Eff.  ‐.286  .182 .918 .035 .074 ‐.052  ‐.026  .099
WB Regulatory Quality  .380  .287 .748 .089 .082 .013  .401  ‐.177
HH Business Freedom  ‐.104  ‐.101 .742 .294 ‐.502 .214  ‐.078  ‐.079
HH Financial Freedom  ‐.271  .043 .732 .388 ‐.053 .139  .365  .096
WEF Business Sophis.  ‐.261  .529 .631 ‐.055 .337 ‐.037  ‐.033  .300
WEF Health and Pri. .402 ‐.079 ‐.030 .884 ‐.043 ‐.067 .043 ‐.021
WEF Tech. Readiness  ‐.081  .122 .397 .794 ‐.373 .155  .155  ‐.042
WEF Market Size .119 .013 ‐.019 ‐.164 .907 .202 .266 ‐.046
WEF Infrastructure  ‐.587  .310 .213 .065 ‐.657 ‐.027  .237  .096
BTILev. Socioecon.Dev. .538 ‐.191 ‐.160 .028 .129 .789 .075 ‐.030
HH Gov’t. Spending  ‐.226  .621 ‐.156 ‐.111 ‐.225 ‐.648  ‐.087  .069
WEF Innovation  ‐.012  .573 .491 ‐.047 .033 .630  .158  .062
HH MonetaryFreedom .463 .029 .094 .433 .222 .059 .725 .000







Although a more thorough investigation of the trends and implications found in 
this analysis will be conducted in the conclusion section of this chapter, it is appropriate 
to summarize a few of the findings here, before the focus changes to discriminant 
analysis.  First, it is evident that labor market efficiency is vital to developing economies, 
as a catalyst for growth at lower stages of development, and as a lubricant to foster 
entrepreneurship at more advanced stages.  This variable was found to be significant with 
respect to one of the intermediate variables in every factor analysis executed, and in 
several instances it was the only variable (or one of a very few) found to exhibit this 
powerful connection.  Second, both business freedom and regulatory quality maintained 
significant relationships with entrepreneurship throughout the study, with both being 
found in the same factor component in three of four matrices.  While likely consistent 
with expectations, arguments might be made for political stability, trade freedom, or 
several other factors to be most important to potential entrepreneurs, though this was not 
found to be the case.  Finally, the Entrepreneurship and Growth variables were never 
found to be within the same identified component.  While this in no way suggests that 
economic growth and a positive entrepreneurial environment are mutually exclusive, it 
does imply that the key factors required for each are likely to be independent; thus, there 
is not likely to be a “magic bullet” that will simultaneously improve both aspects of the 
economic situation within a country. 
D. DISCRIMINATING VARIABLES AMONG ADVANCEMENT GROUPS 
The second method of statistical evaluation used to provide the necessary data for 
this study is discriminant analysis.  In the context of this paper, this process determines 
statistically significant variables in categorizing a country in a specific economic 
development group.  It can thereby reveal which factors are most relevant in 
distinguishing members of one group from another, and therefore which factors most 
likely inhibit an economy from advancing from one development stage to the next.  For 
these analyses, the 46 independent variables previously described were used as potential 
discriminants, though the intermediate variables of “Growth” and “Entrepreneurship” 
were omitted, as the intermediate variables in this structure (the variables that will answer 
the question:  what most likely constrains an economy at a specific level of development 
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from advancing to the subsequent level?) will be revealed through the variables found to 
be discriminating in each analysis, rather than through an associational link.  Table 7 
summarizes the results of the discriminant analysis conducted for the entire sample of 
countries. 




Three variables were shown to be statistically significant in classifying countries 
when all economies in the study were included in the model.  BTI Management Level of 
Difficulty, WEF Technological Readiness and WB Voice and Accountability, in 
descending order of significance, were able to successfully categorize 83.3% of the 
economies in the study into their appropriate WEF Grouping.  This suggests that these 
three variables are particularly relevant in determining which Group a country is in, thus 
performance in these variables is particularly important should an economy seek to be 
classified differently (i.e., in a more advanced category).  
To find the constraints specific to the groups containing the countries being 
examined in this study, discriminant analyses consisting exclusively of Group 2 and 3 
economies, as well as only Groups 3 and 4 were undertaken.  While similar in purpose to 
the analysis of the entire country sample, the results of these analyses provide a slightly 
different perspective in that they exclude countries performing both below and 
significantly above the country of interest.  The value of this methodology rests in its 
ability to determine the variables in which a significant delta in performance equates to a 
 30
difference in categorization for a smaller and more tailored sample of countries.  Thus, if 
a country is performing poorly in these identified variables, there is a statistical degree of 
certainty that they will be classified in the lower group, and vice versa.  Through this 
logic, one can conclude that an improvement in the variables determined most significant 
is the most likely method through which to facilitate advancement to the next group.  
Essentially, this will determine the potential factors that are most likely constraining 
Group 2 countries from advancing to Group 3, and Group 3 countries from advancing to 
Group 4.  Once again, results of the analysis executed for Groups 1 and 2 is omitted due 
to a lack of relevance to the focus countries in this study. 
Table 8 shows the results of the analysis of differentiating variables between 
Groups 2 and 3.  BTI Organization of the Market and Competition and HH Fiscal 
Freedom were found to be the only two statistically significant variables in classifying 
countries in their proper category.  Using these two variables, 74.0% of countries in these 
two Groups were correctly classified in the category they were originally by the 
methodology of the WEF.  Therefore, the implication is that improved performance in 
these variables will facilitate advancement to the higher Group. 
 





The analysis inclusive of only Groups 3 and 4 had substantially different results.  
Once again, only two variables were statistically significant in categorizing the 
economies investigated in this phase, though both were variables which were not 
indicators in any previous stage of the study.  Specifically, WB Rule of Law and BTI 
Level of Socioeconomic Development were together able to classify 86.4% of Group 3 
and 4 countries into the appropriate WEF category.  While the process through which 
values for these variables were originally derived will be considered in future chapters 
should they be deemed constraining in the case of a particular North African country, it is 
important to note at this juncture that the Level of Socioeconomic Development variable 
is a much different indicator than the WEF Groupings themselves, and it should not be 
taken as obvious that one would be found to be correlated to the other. 
 




The general sense of the empirical analysis in this section is that the factors that 
are most constraining to an economy are likely to change as that economy advances.  
While possibly only a confirmation of common sense, the study also offers specific areas 
that are most important to achieving this advancement depending upon the current 
development level of a country.  These thematic areas, along with those identified as 
highly correlated to growth and entrepreneurship in the previous section will be used to 
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construct a tailored development prioritization list for the post-revolution governments of 
Libya, Tunisia and Egypt in the following chapters, and to explain the vicious cycles 
precluding each from sustained economic development in the pre-Arab Spring world. 
E. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The two statistical methods used to conduct this study produced significant, 
though at times less-than-obvious results.  The most striking and easily identified result 
was the strong correlation between efficiency and freedom in a country’s labor markets 
and consistent economic growth, particularly at low and mid-levels of economic 
development.  Both the strength and constancy of the factor association between those 
variables suggest that underperformance in one is likely to result in poor performance in 
the other.  Thus, performance in these two independent variables (WEF Labor Market 
Efficiency and HH Labor Freedom) will be examined in each country case in order to 
derive the factors most likely to have inhibited sustained economic growth. 
The second associational dynamic investigated—which factors most meaningfully 
relate to the creation of a positive entrepreneurial environment—produced less apparent 
conclusions.  During the low and mid-levels of development, three basic generalizations 
can be made regarding the associations displayed by the Entrepreneurship variable.  First, 
the effectiveness of government, inclusive of its ability to combat corruption, maintained 
a correlation with Entrepreneurship, if in some cases secondary.  This suggests that the 
confidence instilled through decreased corruption, including the elimination of required 
“under the table” taxes and business expenses increases organic entrepreneurial initiative.  
Next, legal structures responsible for the quality of regulation and the strength of private 
property rights maintained a link with creation of a strong entrepreneurial environment.  
This confirmation of common sense was proven legitimate enough to be considered as a 
potential barrier to a positive entrepreneurial environment at this level.  Finally, several 
factors of economic freedom, including business, financial, trade, investment and overall 
freedoms, were associated with the Entrepreneurship variable in this portion of the study.  
The strong distinct relationship displayed between entrepreneurship and the HH Overall 
Freedom score in both the analysis inclusive of all countries as well as the “Group 2 
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only” study implies that it may serve as a proxy for countries’ various economic freedom 
scores at this level, though more specifically, the three variables in the “Open Markets” 
category of the Index of Economic Freedom, consisting of Trade Freedom, Financial 
Freedom and Investment Freedom appear to have the most powerful correlation, and this 
estimation will be used in subsequent chapters when considering particular country 
performance.   
As countries advance, the number of variables correlated with Entrepreneurship 
declined significantly.  For Group 3 categorized economies, only freedom of business and 
the macroeconomic environment were strongly related to entrepreneurship.  Several of 
the effectiveness of government variables including freedom from/control of corruption 
and rule of law, as well as legal system-oriented variables such as regulatory quality and 
property rights that were prevalent in the study of less advanced economies still exhibited 
a relationship, though less strongly.  However, for the further purposes of this study, HH 
Business Freedom and WEF Macroeconomic Environment will be utilized as most 
significant, as is consistent with the empirical analysis.  While not germane to the 
countries in this study at the present time, results for the Group 4 analysis were included 
both to help identify trends as well as to determine areas most important in preparation 
for each country’s future.  The Group 4 results were interesting in that there were 5 
primary variables with which Entrepreneurship were correlated; all secondary 
associations had completely disappeared.  This suggests a more profound link between 
business freedom and sophistication, financial freedom, regulatory quality and labor 
market efficiency with entrepreneurship at this more advanced level than the correlations 
found at earlier development stages. 
As a result of the findings of the final study, which was conducted to determine 
which variables were most likely to preclude a country from advancing to the next 
development stage via discriminant analysis, two generalizations can be made.  First, 
there was no overlap between the variables identified as discriminating between all group 
categorizations in the study and those in the two studies conducted to find discriminants 
between two specific groups.  However, particularly in the case of Group 2 countries, 
there was significant overlap between variables identified as constraining and variables 
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identified as highly associated with creation of an environment that is likely to foster 
entrepreneurship.  The two variables identified in the discriminant analysis categorizing 
Group 2 versus Group 3 countries (BTI Organization of the Market and Competition and 
HH Fiscal Freedom) were both associated with Entrepreneurship in the Rotated 
Component Matrix of Group 2 countries, the former primarily and the latter with a 
weaker association.  However, this correlation did not hold true for Group 3 countries, 
wherein the discriminating variables of WB Rule of Law and BTI Level of 
Socioeconomic Development did not have a statistically significant relationship with 
either Growth or Entrepreneurship in both the Rotated Component Matrix for Group 3 
countries as well as for all countries.  It is therefore inconclusive (and within the context 
of this paper, unnecessary to determine) whether the variables constraining development 
are also those that inhibit Entrepreneurship (or Growth).   
The second generalization made from the discriminant analysis results indicates 
that the constraining variables identified were exclusive to the group or groups of 
countries being categorized.  In other words, there was no overlap between results in each 
discriminant analysis.  Thus, the factors that constrain a country from advancement 
evolve as a country develops.  In light of these outcomes, both the variables in the 
discriminant analysis for all countries as well as the variables identified in results for the 
group a particular country is in will be examined as potentially constraining factors in the 
ensuing stages of analysis. 
These results produce the framework that will be utilized in the following 
chapters of this paper.  Each will apply the generalizations and interpretations of the 
results from the analysis in this chapter to the specific cases of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.  
Specifically, each subsequent chapter will begin with a brief evaluation of the 
performance of each pre-revolution government (as it pertains to the economy and human 
development) to provide a context for the study.  This will be followed by an examination 
of each government’s performance in the factors identified in this chapter as being 
potentially inhibiting in at least one of the three studies conducted.  Finally, specific areas 
wherein the government underperformed in a critical area will be briefly considered  
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within the specific situation of each country, creating a logical explanation for the vicious 
economic cycles that were at least to some degree manifest in each country prior to the 























III. AN ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ECONOMIC FOCUS AREAS 
FOR THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT OF LIBYA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Forty-two years of authoritarian rule under Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi resulted in the 
near-complete destruction of the Libyan economy.  Despite significant factor 
endowments that enrich the country via hydrocarbon rents, the economy of Libya is 
widely regarded as among the most dysfunctional in the world.35  From “eliminating the 
private sector and all private initiatives and entrepreneurship” to “buying off the 
population by making itself the principal source of income for most households,” Qadhafi 
retarded any potential for long-term development or efficient bureaucracies.36  However, 
to some degree due to the sheer quantity of issues prevalent in post-Qadhafi Libya, 
answers to questions regarding how the incoming government can best foster an 
economic environment conducive to growth and entrepreneurial activity are difficult to 
ascertain.  This is also true of questions concerning the crucial areas in which 
improvement is required for Libya to advance toward a more developed economic stage.  
Indeed, the most likely (and while possibly accurate, patently inadequate) response to 
questions regarding what must change is, “everything.”  However, in consideration of the 
herculean task the incoming government of Libya will be undertaking, a more tailored 
approach to structural change, with a focus upon the critical factors most capable of 
achieving significant positive transformation is required.  This chapter will identify, as 
well as examine the recent condition of, the factors that have created a vicious cycle of 
economic underperformance to the detriment of the Libyan population. 
Results from this chapter suggest that progress in four key areas is required to best 
effect positive economic change in Libya.  Specifically, there must be progression in the 
                                                 
35 See Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 137 for a 
critique of the economic policies of the Qadhafi regime in the earlier portion of his administration and 199–
203 for an examination of how attempts at economic reform and privatization in more recent times were 
undermined by a lack of required accompanying institutional reform. 
36 Alia Brahimi, “Islam in Libya” in Islamist Radicalisation in North Africa: Politics and Process, ed. 
George Joffé (London: Routledge, 2012), 15. 
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quality of the regulatory environment, the freedom and efficiency of labor markets must 
be improved, the population must obtain greater voice and accountability in the process 
of government and competitiveness and organization in economic markets must be 
initiated in order to remedy Libya’s current economic predicament.  The analysis 
whereby these conclusions will be reached will begin by briefly evaluating the 
performance of the pre-revolution government (as it pertains to the economy and human 
development) to provide a context for the study.  This will be followed by summarizing 
the results of a statistical analysis of potentially constraining factors in developing 
economies.  An examination of the Qadhafi government’s performance in the factors 
identified via the general statistical analysis as being potentially inhibiting will then be 
conducted to determine the areas in which Libya most significantly underperformed.  
Finally, the specific elements of underperformance in each critical area will be briefly 
considered.  This will create a logical explanation for the vicious economic cycle that was 
manifest in Libya prior to the Arab Spring, and will thus identify what must change to 
transform that vicious cycle into a virtuous one. 
B. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE QADHAFI REGIME 
Libya, due to the vast hydrocarbon resources within its borders, is a rich country.  
However, the richness of a country as measured through economic data often does not 
equate to an improvement in the lives of the populous—this as a result of governmental 
policy decisions and implementation.37  The degree to which the income of a country 
creates an improvement in the lives of its people can be measured in many ways, and is 
often dependent upon what a person or culture deem important.  However, there are 
circumstances and environmental structures within a society that, when advanced, are 
generally agreed to improve the human condition.  One well-respected measure of these 
conditions is the World Bank’s Human Development Report (HDR).  Nobel Laureate and 
HDR contributor Amartya Sen explains:  "human development, as an approach, is 
concerned with what I take to be the basic development idea: namely, advancing the 
richness of human life, rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings 
                                                 
37 Collier and Dollar, “Can the World Cut Poverty in Half?,” 1787. 
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live, which is only a part of it."38  When these measures of human development are 
compared to the macroeconomic data representative of an economy, the effectiveness of 
governmental policies and their implementation can, at least to some degree, be 
discerned.39  Table 10 shows the performance of Libya’s government in the pre-Arab 
Spring era, as well as the performance of comparator countries. 
These numbers suggest that the Qadhafi-led regime in Libya slightly 
underperformed in comparison to expectations based upon the country’s income, though 
perhaps not as dramatically as anticipated.  However, as is generally the case with all 
economic data, there is ambiguity in the numbers.  Consider Libya when compared to 
fellow MENA country Kuwait, which is ranked below Libya in human development 
(63rd) despite a per capita income 340% the value of Libya’s.40  The data demonstrating 
the poor performance of the government of Kuwait are far more compelling than are 
those of Libya.  While this in no way excuses or justifies the performance of Libya’s 
government in failing to create an environment that “advances the richness of human 
life,” it does suggest that this comparison may not distinguish the Qadhafi regime as 
particularly inept.  In fact, outside of Jordan (as seen in Table 10), all MENA countries 
underperform in human development relative to their national income.41  This can in part 
be explained by cultural factors inherent in Islamic countries, where women’s rights and 
productivity are less positively exploited than in other areas of the world.  Since these 
metrics contribute to human development rankings, this failing may (at least partially) 
elucidate the consistent underperformance by this sample geographic region.  It may also 
provide a logic regarding Libya’s better than anticipated performance in HDR (despite its 
                                                 
38 Amartya Sen, Human Development Reports web, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/, (accessed May 
11, 2012) 
39 See Henry and Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development, 25, for an example of 
the relevance and utilization of this methodology. 
40 Libya’s actual GNI per capita in constant 2005 dollars in 2010 was $15,767, while Kuwait’s was 
$46,428. Human Development Reports website, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/100106.html, 
(accessed May 11, 2012). 
41 Tunisia’s HDI rank in 2010 (93rd) was equal to its 2010 GNI per capita rank.  
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slightly negative rating) as the “revolutionary leadership’s policies regarding the 
advancement of women have largely eradicated gender discrimination” in Libya.42                                              
Table 10.   Libya and Comparators’ Economic Performance vs. “Expected” 
 
However, there are more qualitative assessments of the conditions present in 
Libya that suggest the data does not show the true extent of the ineptitude of Qadhafi’s 
government.  In fact, the analysis of many scholars intimates far harsher evaluations of 
the performance of the Qadhafi regime than what the data suggest.  There is a consensus 
in the literature regarding development in North Africa that, “the acute poverty and 
underdevelopment (principally) in the eastern regions of Libya is particularly stark, given 
the country’s vast oil resources and tiny population (around 5.5 million).”43  This type of 
condemnation of Colonel Qadhafi’s management of the Libyan economy is 
representative of most scholars knowledgeable in the area.  Thus, the general sense of 
both the data and the literature is that the pre-Arab Spring government in Libya failed to 
take advantage of its income (provided in large part from hydrocarbon rents) to improve 
                                                 
42 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010, Libya Country Report (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 
10. 
43 Alison Pargeter, “Localism and Radicalization in North Africa: Local Factors and the Development 
of Political Islam in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya,” International Affairs 85 (2009): 1036. 







































the lives of its citizenry, despite advances in some areas such as women’s rights.44  
Therefore, the opportunity exists for the incoming government to significantly improve 
the economic conditions present in Libya.  However, determining which areas are most in 
need of modification for this improvement to become manifest is not obvious, and is the 
core of the following sections of this chapter. 
C. IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC AREAS INHIBITING LIBYA’S 
ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
Results from the factor analysis as explained in Chapter II show a strong 
correlation between growth of Group 2 countries (including Libya) and labor markets.  
Both the WEF Labor Market Efficiency and the HH Labor Freedom variables exhibited a 
strong relationship with growth among countries at this stage of development.  Moreover, 
they were the only factors of the 46 examined that displayed this association with growth, 
further strengthening the connection between these variables.  To effectively utilize these 
results for Libya’s particular situation, an evaluation of the performance of the Qadhafi 
regime in these metrics is required to ascertain which (if any) are likely factors in 
constraining growth in the specific case of Libya.  Table 11 summarizes the performance 
of Libya in these metrics as compared to the mean values of WEF groupings as well as 








                                                 
44 See Henry and Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development, 45, to find data showing 
that 93% of Libyan governmental revenues came via oil rents in 2007. Original source:  International 
Monetary Fund Article IV Publications. 
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Table 11.   Libya’s Performance in Key Growth Metrics 
 
 
The variables determined to be correlated with a positive entrepreneurial 
environment were more ambiguous, but consistent with the analysis provided in Chapter 
II, Libya’s performance in those deemed most significant to Group 2 countries is 
provided in Table 12.  Libya’s performance in the variables determined through 
discriminant analysis to be most correlated with inhibiting advancement to the next stage 
of development, both in the case of all country groupings and in the analysis of only 
Group 2 vs. Group 3 countries, is summarized in Table 13.  The summary of results 
represented in these tables demonstrates both Libya’s relative performance in these key 
factors as well as the correlation that improvement in each variable has with group 
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Table 13.   Libya’s Performance in Key Advancement Metrics 
 
 
Libya scores below both the Group 2 mean result as well as the mean score of 
MENA countries in 12 of the 13 metrics found to be statistically significant in 
discriminating between developing countries in at least one executed model.  Even more 
concerning, Libya’s performance is significantly poorer than even the Group 1 mean 
score (despite it being classified as a Group 2 country) in ten key metrics and is 
approximately equal to the Group 1 mean in another (WEF Technological Readiness).  
All 11 of these metrics exhibit a positive correlation with advancement, as the mean 
scores increase for each progressively more advanced group of countries with the 
exception of a small drop in mean score from Group 1 to Group 2 in WB Voice and 


































































































Accountability and WEF Labor Market Efficiency.  Libya scores above the Group 2 
mean in BTI Management Level of Difficulty, and although Libya also scores 
significantly below the Group 2 and MENA means in HH Fiscal Freedom, there is not a 
clear correlation between improvement in this metric and more advanced classification, 
muddying the waters regarding its value in the context of this study.   
Thus, eight subjects (treating the two labor market variables as a single topic, as 
well as the two factors involving property rights and the two measures of corruption) 
distinguish themselves as the most significant areas upon which the post-Arab Spring 
government of Libya should focus in order to most efficiently advance and grow its 
economy.  In order to more completely understand exactly what each of these variables 
explains, the condition of each metric in Qadhafi-led Libya will herein be examined.  
Additionally, the economic vicious cycle that inhibited Libya’s citizenry from achieving 
prosperity throughout Qadhafi’s reign will be outlined and described through this 
exercise.   
D. ANALYSIS OF QADHAFI REGIME PERFORMANCE IN KEY AREAS  
The assertion that entrepreneurship was stifled by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s regime 
is merely a statement of the obvious.  It was in fact a guiding principle and purposeful 
manifestation of Qadhafi’s method of maintaining control of the economy of Libya 
through centralized governmental domination of industry.  While this ideology softened 
during Qadhafi’s latter years (although the rhetoric espousing privatization and economic 
liberalization far outpaced its actual implementation), the repercussions from years of 
private sector deterioration are significant and continue to be evident in Libya today.45  
This, supported by the fact that Libya performed more poorly than even the average of 
Group 1 countries in every metric correlated with entrepreneurship in this study, dictates 
the separation of entrepreneurship-related variables from those of growth and stage  
 
 
                                                 
45 Ronald Bruce St. John, “Libya: Reforming the Economy, not the Polity,” in North Africa:  Politics, 
Region,  and the Limits of Transformation, eds. Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah-Fernandez (London:  
Routledge), 2008, 61–62. 
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advancement.  For these reasons, these variables will be given a more cursory treatment, 
followed by a more in-depth look at Libya’s condition in factors relevant to the other 
categorizations. 
1. An Examination of Variables Affecting Entrepreneurship 
a. Corruption in Qadhafi’s Libya 
Corruption is likely the most obvious thematic area to be examined, as 
well as the one least in need of explanation.  The level of control possessed by a small 
group of individuals, led by Qadhafi himself, in Libya prior to the revolution was the 
main ingredient in a system generally conducive to significant corruption.  Stemming 
from a strong security sector maintained through patrimonial networks funded by 
hydrocarbon rents that were not subject to civilian oversight, combined with a lack of 
true voice in government by the populous to serve as a check to potential abuses, 
corruption was (and still is) systemic in Libya.46  The business community is negatively 
affected both through the siphoning of potential sources of income as well as the 
uncertainty created by its prevalence.  Indeed, corruption is perceived as the most 
problematic factor for doing business in Libya according to the results of the Executive 
Opinion Survey conducted by the World Economic Forum.47  However, as alluded to, 
corruption was and is not a root cause of a poor entrepreneurial environment since it is in 
large part the product of a political environment that eased its perpetuation.  Rather it is 
an intermediate issue that has significant consequences in retarding the Libyan economy, 
though it can likely be substantially improved through changes to the political system 
wherein it was created and maintained. 
b. Quality of Regulation in Qadhafi’s Libya 
This metric is in many ways an amalgamation of other factors that will be 
examined later in the chapter.  The economic and political regulation administered by a 
                                                 
46 See Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 206 and Heritage Foundation (accessed June 14, 
2012), http://www.heritage.org/index/country/libya for assessments of the government of Libya that 
provide evidence for this statement. 
47 The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011 (Geneva: World Economic Forum), 2010, 216. 
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government covers a vast number of areas, the laws of which combine to help create the 
economic environment of a country.  There is substantial evidence that in the case of pre-
revolution Libya, the quality of regulation was substandard, creating issues throughout 
the economy that were essentially caused by ineffective government rooted in poorly-
conceived regulatory laws combined with unfair and counterproductive implementation.  
“The lack of economic data in Libya, the occasional physical destruction of state 
bureaucratic offices and records, and the state’s sporadic direct intervention in issues 
ranging from employment to price setting to property rights issues were all signs of 
regulatory weakness.”48  Thus, the regulatory environment of Libya seems to be a causal 
factor of its poor performance, the reform of which can have second and third order 
effects to the benefit (or detriment) of the economic environment, inclusive of the 
formation of a positive entrepreneurial atmosphere. 
c.  Private Property Rights in Qadhafi’s Libya 
 Qadhafi’s vision of the utopian Libyan society was essentially a socialist 
construct in which the public sector dominated and creation of personal wealth was 
frowned upon for those outside of his inner circle.  This included the possession of 
property, as laws were passed which limited the ability of a person to acquire and own 
property.  In Libya, “private property rights have not been upheld, and property 
ownership has been limited to a single dwelling per family, with all other properties 
confiscated and redistributed.”49  Although “modifications to the Estate Property Law in 
2004 (legalized) the private ownership of more than one accommodation unit,” in the 
context of the business environment, the weakness of laws protecting the ownership of 
private property are extremely problematic as they undermine the confidence of both 
indigenous potential entrepreneurs as well as foreign investors that the claims to property 
acquired from the business they build will be legally upheld.50  This is a result of the laws 
made and regulations enforced by the government, and is a critical element impeding the 
                                                 
48 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 204.  
49 Heritage Foundation, (accessed June 14, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/index/country/libya. 
50 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010, Libya Country Report (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 
15. 
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confidence of both businessmen as well as private citizens for whom wealth creation is 
meaningless, since in many instances they cannot maintain possession of what they 
acquire. 
d. Overall Economic Freedom in Qadhafi’s Libya 
As discussed in Chapter II, the overall economic freedom metric showed a 
strong correlation with the Entrepreneurship variable, though the variables contained in 
the “Open Markets” portion of the Index of Economic Freedom provided more specificity 
and clarity in this area.  Of the three “Open Markets” variables, Libya scored in the 77th 
percentile of countries in this study in Trade Freedom, but extremely poorly in the other 
two (Investment Freedom and Financial Freedom) ranking in the 5th percentile in both of 
these factors.   Summarizing the issues responsible for Libya’s performance in these 
areas, Heritage House explains that, “banks were nationalized decades ago, and the 
financial sector has been subject to state influence. Limited access to financing has 
severely impeded any meaningful private business development.”51  There is significant 
overlap and interrelation of the variables being examined which this section highlights.  
The concerns touched upon here are functions of the issues analyzed in the regulatory 
quality and private property sections, and will be examined in more detail in the analysis 
of the BTI Organization of the Market and Competition factor later in this chapter. 
 2. An Examination of Variables Affecting Growth and Stage 
Advancement 
a. Labor Market Freedom and Efficiency in Qadhafi’s Libya 
Libya had the lowest score of any economy in the study in both of the 
(quite related) metrics determined to be vital to the growth of an economy in the 
construct comprising all countries as well as the construct comprised of only countries at 
a similar stage of development as Libya.  Both of these variables involve the legal 
structure and perceptions of the workforce in a country rather than the percentage of 
eligible persons employed, which has an obvious (and thus less useful) correlation with 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
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growth.  The Labor Freedom variable consists of six different areas including the “ratio 
of minimum wage to the average value added per worker, hindrance to hiring additional 
workers, rigidity of hours, difficulty of firing redundant employees, legally mandated 
notice period, and mandatory severance pay.”52  Although Libyan labor laws create a 
progressive and fair working environment for employees with such protections as limited 
working hours (8 hours a day maximum, 48 hours a week maximum for women, 6 hours 
a day maximum for minors), generous mandatory breaks, substantial leave based upon 
tenure and 3 months of mandatory maternity leave, it also contains clauses that are 
potentially extremely challenging when considering worker productivity from the 
standpoint of a firm. 53  For example, Labour Law no. 58 of 1970 states that, “in the case 
of normal sickness, an employee is entitled to 60% of his or her income for a period of 
one year.”  Additionally, an employer cannot terminate a contract with an employee until 
such a time as an employee’s illness, “prevents him or her from performing his or her 
duties for a continuous period of not less than 120 days or a total number of 200 days 
over the course of a year.”54  Legal restrictions such as these may be significantly 
constraining Libyan firms, ultimately retarding growth. 
In surveys conducted by the World Economic Forum, the general 
consensus among Libyan business executives is that pay in their country is largely 
unrelated to the productivity of the worker, that the relationship between workers and 
employers is generally uncooperative, that senior positions are most often given based 
upon relationships rather than merit, and that the best and brightest often leave for 
opportunities in other countries—evidence of the proverbial “brain drain.”55  Regarding 
governmental policies, respondents suggested that companies had little flexibility in 
determining the wages they would offer (it was determined through government 
processes) and the ability of companies to hire and fire workers based upon performance 
                                                 
52 Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/index/labor-freedom (accessed May 30, 2012). 
53 Eversheds and Mukhtar, Kelbash and Elgharabli, “Employment Law for Libyan and Foreign 
Employees,” in Doing Business in Libya, ed. Jonathan Wallace and Marat Terterov (London: Kogan Page, 
2002), 72–73. 
54 Ibid. 
55 The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010), 444–451. 
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was significantly impeded by regulations.  Indeed, Libya performed extraordinarily 
poorly in every aspect of the labor market metric, with percentile scores ranging from 
<1% (i.e., lowest of all countries) to the 16th percentile among all countries measured. 56  
This omnipresent underperformance precludes the analysis from further specificity, 
though it is still possible to provide policy recommendations more definitive than, 
“improve the labor markets.” 
Any recommendation that emerges from this analysis must have its 
genesis in the portions of the market most significantly influenced by government and 
legal policies.  To that end, combatting the cycle of labor market inefficiency begins with 
altering current legal requirements and norms with respect to hiring and firing practices 
and wage determination, allowing for corporate competition and flexibility.  While this 
has the potential to hurt the poorest, unskilled workers (thus likely affirming the need for 
some legal safety net including a minimum wage), it also will have the anticipated effect 
of increasing worker productivity and improving worker-employer relations.  
Theoretically, in addition to enhancing domestic product, this will ultimately increase 
wages and grow a more educated workforce.  As the immediate outcome of increased 
worker productivity is a rise in corporate profits, corporations will be able to offer 
improved compensation, which in turn will attract the best and brightest indigenous 
workers who may have previously looked elsewhere for employment.  This may further 
improve worker productivity, creating the desired virtuous cycle.  While this is a 
somewhat utopian view of the potential effects of labor market reform, it is important to 
note that this is merely an interpretation of the implications inherent in the empirical data 
previously derived, rather than a proposition of methods for reform advanced without 
context. 
b. Technological Readiness in Qadhafi’s Libya 
Technological readiness, when compared to labor markets, is a less 
complex problem to outline, though no less difficult to correct.  It is in large part an effect 
of Libya’s lack of a middle class and widespread poverty.  With indicators such as only 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
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2 broadband internet subscribers per 1000 people in Qadhafi’s final year (more recent 
statistics show this metric having increased to 11 per 1000 people—still an anemic 
number) and only 5.5 internet users per 100 people in 2009, the lack of technology use by 
the population is evident.  Moreover, estimations of technology absorption by businesses 
and the availability of the latest technologies to the general population are fairly poor, 
though these metrics are hovering around the 30th percentile of all countries studied, 
which is not inconsistent with the performance of Group 2 countries in general.57 
While government has the ability to provide the necessary infrastructure to 
make broadband internet and other technologies available throughout the country, 
improvement in this metric demands a larger percentage of the population have the 
disposable income required to take advantage of the opportunity.  Thus, it is unlikely that 
substantial improvement in this metric can be achieved without prior economic 
improvements resulting in a larger middle class with an increased ability to pay for 
technological conveniences.  Progress in this area may be more a secondary consequence 
of policies that afford increased opportunity for employment at higher wages than an 
independent prerequisite for improved economic circumstance.  Through this logic, 
technological readiness becomes an indicator that current policies are working, rather 
than being a source of that success.  This is consistent with the results of the statistical 
analysis, as this variable was found to be a discriminating factor in group classification, 
but should not be considered to have a causal relationship with growth or development.  
Therefore, in the construct of this research, it becomes an intermediate, rather than 
independent variable. 
c. Voice and Accountability in Qadhafi’s Libya 
Of the 102 developing countries included in this study, Libya ranked last 
in Voice and Accountability as determined through the World Bank Governance 
Indicators.  The metric of Voice and Accountability is defined by the World Bank as an 
attempt to “capture perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
                                                 
57 Numbers in this section were taken from both The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011, 
World Economic Forum (Geneva: World Economic Forum), 2010, 464–468, and World Bank 
Development Indicators (accessed May 31, 2012), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/. 
 52
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media.”58  It is a fair measure of the “alleged ‘freedom deficit’ that 
prevent(s) sustained development in the (MENA) region.”59  Despite Qadhafi’s purported 
vision of direct democracy as defined in his Green Book, the Jamahiriya was in large part 
a farce, as elected officials at every level had little real power.  Indeed, the revolutionary 
leadership (essentially the executive branch led by Qadhafi himself) which was “not 
elected and (could) not be voted out of office…dictate(d) the decision-making power of 
the second sector, the “Jamahiriya Sector.”60  Moreover, freedom of expression was 
defined by a government controlled media wherein “any articles critical of current 
policies (were)…intentionally placed by the revolutionary leadership itself…as a means 
of initiating reforms.”61 
It is evident that the incoming government of Libya will have an excellent 
opportunity to improve upon the standard set by the Qadhafi regime in this metric—it is 
difficult not to improve upon a classification of worst in the world.  Yet the relationship 
between the voice and accountability of a population with the economic development of 
the country is less evident.  There are a multitude of reasons this measure of democracy is 
positively associated with development, including significant quantitative data 
demonstrating that democracies utilize their assets more efficiently, enjoy superior anti-
corruption policy and maintain a higher level of coordination in policy decision-making 
than do autocracies.62  Methodologically, this variable is similar to technological 
readiness in that its association with economic group categorization is not proven as 
causal through the discriminant analysis.  However, in this case, the variable being 
examined is not a measure of a consequence of good economics, but rather a measure of 
government which might create better economic outcomes.  Thus, in the context of this 
                                                 
58 The World Bank, World Governance Indicators (accessed May 9, 2012).  
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/va.pdf. 
59 Henry and Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development, 67. 
60 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 – Libya Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, 6. 
61 Ibid, 7. 
62 Transformation Index BTI 2012:  Political Management in International Comparison, ed. 
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thesis, the overwhelming control maintained by Qadhafi over all aspects of government 
(including the economy) is established as a significant cause of the country’s vicious 
economic cycle. 
d. Organization of Market and Competition in Qadhafi’s Libya  
The phenomena being measured by this metric are less obvious from its 
title than were the previous three.  The BTI analyzes the performance of countries in four 
different areas, the results of which are averaged to arrive at the final rating.  These areas 
are market-based competition, anti-monopoly policy, liberalization of foreign trade and 
the banking system.  Libya scored poorly in three of these categories, with performance 
in the “liberalization of foreign trade” metric below-average, but significantly better than 
its results in the other three due to the opening of the economy to foreign investment 
since the lifting of sanctions in 2003.63   
Within the petro-chemical industry, the revolutionary leadership did 
facilitate a more “free market framework” in the years prior to the Arab Spring.  
However, “efforts at industrial reform outside the petrochemical sector…yielded little 
progress.”  Similar to issues potentially caused by a lack of democracy, bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and lack of a legal framework caused slow and often counterproductive 
policy decision-making by the highest levels of government (as Qadhafi was the only 
person empowered to decree and implement reforms).64  Anti-monopoly policy also 
displayed only minor improvement, with many key industries including oil, aviation and 
energy production remaining state-owned.  The banking system was also defined by a 
high degree of centralization combined with ineffective attempts at reform during 
Qadhafi’s final years.  Although private ownership of financial institutions has been 
permitted since 1993, regional banks established by local communities were still “subject 
to the supervision of the Central Bank.”65  While prior to the Arab Spring, technological 
                                                 
63 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Libya Country Report, BTI website (accessed June 1, 2012), 
http://www.bti-project.org/laendergutachten/mena/lby/2012/#chap7. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Marat Terterov and the Libyan Insurance Company, “Banking and Insurance,” in Doing Business in 
Libya, ed. Jonathan Wallace and Marat Terterov (London:  Kogan Page, 2002), 34. 
 54
support from international organizations was reported to be assisting in the modernization 
of the banking system, it remains in need of significant improvement.66  In general, the 
financial system in Libya, despite some efforts at reform in recent years, was inefficient, 
outdated and centrally controlled. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The statistical methods utilized in this study can only prove correlation, not 
causation.  This mandated the use of logical deductive analysis in conjunction with those 
statistical techniques to attain the desired results.  From the original 46 independent 
variables analyzed as potential factors for the economic problems endemic to Libya, the 
computer-based discriminant and factor analyses yielded 13 that were most correlated 
with either growth, entrepreneurship or group advancement.  From these 13 variables, 
Libya was found to be underperforming in 12.  Among those 12, one was determined to 
have an unclear correlation with positive economic results (HH Fiscal Freedom) and 
three pairs of two were judged to be independent measures of the same construct (WEF 
Labor Market Efficiency and HH Labor Freedom, HH Property Rights and BTI Private 
Property, and WB Control of Corruption and HH Freedom from Corruption).  Of the 
remaining eight (assuming each pair of two as one), four were determined to be causal 
through qualitative and logical analysis, with three being intermediate variables and one 
(WEF Technological Readiness), being established as an indicator of the success of more 
positive economic policies, rather than a cause of the economic vicious cycle for which 
the Qadhafi regime was responsible.  Thus, four causal factors were found to be most 
responsible for the failures of the Libyan government in creating an environment 
conducive to economic and human development.  Specifically, counter-productive laws 
creating inefficiencies in the labor market, a lack of voice in government by the populous 
creating inefficient utilization of assets and encouraging corruption, a regulatory 
environment constricting ownership of private property and a lack of organization in 
financial markets inclusive of a banking system that inhibits growth and development 
effectively serve to diminish the potential of the Libyan economy.  Figure 1 displays how 
                                                 
66 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 — Libya Country Report, BTI website (accessed June 1, 2012), 
http://www.bti-project.org/laendergutachten/mena/lby/2012/#chap7 . 
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these variables interrelate to form a vicious cycle of economic futility that the incoming 
government must remedy to most effectively improve the inherited economic conditions 
present within Libya. 
 
Figure 1.   Libya’s Vicious Cycle  
While potentially unsatisfying due to its complexity, the figure above reflects the 
conclusions of this chapter.  Essentially, although the post-Arab Spring government of 
Libya will have enormous tasks of organization, legitimization and consolidation of 
power, their efforts in the realm of creation of economic prosperity should be focused 
upon the four causal factors identified to effect positive transformation most expediently.  
Improvement in these key areas will have the anticipated effects of decreasing corruption, 
improving coordination and effectiveness of policy decision-making, combatting the loss 
of the brightest minds to foreign competition through an improved labor situation, 
spurring entrepreneurship by protecting the private property of both firms and 
individuals, and enabling economic growth through a more modern and effective banking 
system.  The outcomes of these improvements will become manifest through enhanced 
economic circumstance as measured by such metrics as increased immersion of 
technology by firms and usage of technology by the populous, as well as other standard 
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measures of human development.  Transforming the economy of Libya in these identified 
areas will ultimately enable the goal of these policies, which is creation of a virtuous 
















IV. AN ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ECONOMIC FOCUS AREAS 
FOR THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT OF TUNISIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The repression of the Tunisian people by the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had 
substantial economic, as well as political consequences.  Politically, the subjugation of 
the people through deprivation of freedoms was obvious, the eventual consequence of 
which was political revolution leading to Ben Ali’s removal from power in early 2011.  
Economically, the manifestations of authoritarianism were more subtle, though no less 
oppressive to the Tunisian populous.  The methods of economic oppression utilized by 
the Ben Ali regime, though implemented with the likely purpose of obtaining and 
maintaining power, had consequences detrimental to the Tunisian people, including 
poverty, a lower-than-expected level of socioeconomic development, high unemployment 
for the young and well-educated, high adult illiteracy rates and poor regulatory quality.  
However, these factors are ultimately caused by structural elements endemic to the 
economic system, of which it is the goal of this paper to identify.  
This chapter details the fundamental causes of the economic issues resultant of 
Ben Ali’s version of authoritarianism.  Six specific causes are identified as the roots of 
economic underperformance as a consequence of oppressive policies.  These causal 
factors are a repressive tax system, an inadequate educational structure, a lack of 
employment opportunity for the young, a state-dominated banking system, pervasive 
clientelism in business and a lack of civil society traditions.  The process through which 
these elements became established and subsequently interacted in order to produce the 
desired end-state of political domination—while simultaneously creating a less 
prosperous Tunisia—will be explored and defined in this chapter.  
B. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BEN ALI REGIME 
As initially presented in the analysis of Libya in the previous chapter, one method 
of elucidating the competency of a state in implementing policy is through a comparison 
of a country’s income to its human development.  Although in the case of Tunisia, a 
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comparison of its Human Development Index (HDI) to GDP fails to distinguish the 
performance of the Ben Ali government as maladroit (as it ranks 96th in income and 94th 
in HDI out of the 187 countries included in 2011 data, and 93rd in both as reflected in the 
2010 publication), a more detailed examination of the numbers may illuminate the 
government’s successes and failures at least to some degree.  In many respects, Tunisia 
was economically successful under the leadership of Ben Ali, even being referred to as 
the “economic miracle” country of the Middle East in much of the literature of the pre-
Arab Spring decade.  Even the literature condemning the political repression that 
undeniably existed maintained a focus upon the contradiction between this style of 
government and the economic success which Tunisia attained.67  Accepting that Tunisia 
was not an economic failure to the degree of Libya, a nuanced consideration of the 
various components of human development is required to attain an understanding of pre-
Arab Spring condition in Tunisia. Thus, using the Human Development Index (HDI) 
again as a guide, Tunisia’s performance in each component of the Index must be 
considered.  The categories that will be considered, as they are contributing factors to 
HDI, include metrics representing prevalence of poverty, equality via income 
distribution, gender equality, and measures of the health and education of the population. 
In the Multidimensional Poverty Index, which is a “measure of the percentage of 
deprivations that the average person would experience if the deprivations of poor 
households were shared equally across the population,” Tunisia is ranked 24th of the 
109 developing countries measured.68  In gender equality, again Tunisia excels, ranking 
ahead of the United States at 45th out of the 146 countries included in the study.69  In the 
HDI’s health metric, Tunisia performed in line or possibly even slightly above 
expectations ranking 70th out of the 194 countries comprising the Health Index.  
However, Tunisia ranks 81st out of 134 countries in the HDR’s version of an inequality 
                                                 
67 Beatrice Hibou and John Hulsey, “Domination & Control in Tunisia: Economic Levers for the 
Exercise of Authoritarian Power,” Review of African Political Economy 33, no. 108, (June, 2006): 187.   
68 47 of the 60 countries that rank highest in Human Development were omitted from this study, 
presumably because poverty is not as significant of a problem in these states. This should be noted when 
considering Tunisia’s surprisingly high ranking in this metric. Human Development Indicators, (accessed 
July 15, 2012), http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/build/. 
69 Ibid. 
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index called Inequality Adjusted HDI, in which the basic dimensions forming the HDI 
are adjusted for inequalities.70  Its performance was also fairly poor in education, ranking 
110th out of 188 in the Education Index.71  Thus, while overall Tunisia’s ranking in 
human development is in line with the expectations created by its GDP, inequality and 
education are two areas in which the country underperformed during the last years of the 
Ben Ali regime.  As will be analyzed further in Section D, these areas are also identified 
as contributing factors to the vicious cycle the conclusions of this chapter detail. 
C. IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC AREAS INHIBITING TUNISIA’S 
ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
The analysis performed in Chapter II advances results that identify variables 
correlated to growth, entrepreneurship and group advancement for Group 3 countries, 
including Tunisia.  These correlations are suggestive of potential causes of poorer-than-
optimal economic performance experienced by the Tunisian people during the Ben Ali 
regime.  In order to determine which of these identified potential causes of 
underperformance determined to be most relevant to Group 3 countries are applicable to 
the particular case of Tunisia, the performance of the country in each potential factor is 
herein examined.  The variables most relevant to countries at approximately the same 
stage of development as Tunisia in which Tunisia is shown to have underperformed will 
be considered areas wherein improvement by the incoming regime is most necessary.  
These identified areas will be analyzed in further detail to find a logical construct of the 
vicious economic cycle experienced by Tunisia (though to a far less obvious extent than 
the previous example of Libya) during the Ben Ali era. 
As with Group 2 countries such as Libya, the factors most associated with 
economic growth for Group 3 countries are measures of the condition of the labor 
markets within those states.  As shown in Table 14, Tunisia’s performance in both the 
WEF’s Labor Market Efficiency factor and HH’s Labor Freedom variable is in-line with 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71  The sustainability metric, though important, has a negative correlation with development, and is 
therefore omitted from this summary of results. Data taken from HDR website (accessed July 17, 2012), 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/build/. 
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expectations for Group 3 countries as defined by the mean performance of the group, 
though its performance is poorer than the mean of Group 4 countries, particularly in the 
WEF variable calculation.  Moreover, Tunisia’s performance in both is significantly 
higher than the mean of regional comparators.  As discussed in Chapter III, both of these 
variables show a positive correlation with group advancement, though WEF Labor 
Market Efficiency does show a small decline in performance from countries identified as 
Group 1 to those identified as Group 2.  This suggests that while the condition of 
Tunisia’s labor markets requires improvement in the future to perform at a level 
consistent with more economically advanced countries, it is not likely that labor markets 
were a causal factor inhibiting the Tunisian economy prior to the Arab Spring revolution. 




Of the 11 variables found to have at least a secondary association with 
entrepreneurial environment in the factor analyses performed for Group 3 countries as 
well as that performed for all countries, Tunisia actually outperformed expectations based 
upon group mean in 10.  In fact, Tunisia’s performance was in line with even more 
economically mature Group 4 countries in 6 of the 11 factors.  The WB’s Regulatory 
Quality indicator of good governance was the only metric in which Tunisia’s evaluation 














































was below the Group 3 mean, and even it was only slightly so.  However, principally 
because of its unique position as the singular factor in which Tunisia’s performance was 
questionable, regulatory quality as defined by the World Bank is identified as an area 
requiring improvement by the incoming government of Tunisia. 
The discriminant analysis conducted in Chapter II concluded that five variables 
were most able to classify countries into their proper grouping when all countries were 
considered or when only Group 3 and Group 4 countries were included in the analysis.  
Of these five factors, Tunisia performed better than the Group 3 mean in two (WEF 
Technological Readiness and WB Rule of Law) and underperformed in the other three. 
Most significantly, Tunisia’s performance in the WB Voice and Accountability metric 
was found to be inferior to even Group 1 and 2 means, as evidenced in Table 16.  In the 
two other factors in which Tunisia’s performance was weak (BTI Management Level of 
Difficulty and BTI Level of Socioeconomic Development), it performed in line with 
Group 2 countries, but well below expectations as determined by the mean of its Group 3 
comparators.  Thus, these three variables, as well as WB Regulatory Quality as described 
in the previous paragraph, will be considered as causes of Tunisia’s economic concerns, 
and are the areas this analysis suggests will most readily effect positive change if 
































































































































































































Table 16.   Tunisia’s Performance in Key Advancement Metrics 
 
 
D. ANALYSIS OF BEN ALI’S REGIME PERFORMANCE IN KEY AREAS 
The four variables that have been empirically identified as the most likely 
candidates for Tunisia’s lack of economic advancement prior to the Arab Spring will be 
considered in more detail in this section.  Application of the statistical methods and 
conclusions of Chapter II have led to the reduction in potential causes of economic 
ineptitude from the original 46 possibilities to these four.  While there is little doubt that 
improvement in other areas outside of those to be examined will be required in order for 
positive change in economic circumstance to most fully be realized by the citizens of 
Tunisia, the rigorous methodology implemented herein suggests that these four factors 
should be the top priorities addressed by Tunisia’s incoming government.  The condition 
of each of these factors in pre-revolution Tunisia will be summarized, and a judgment on 






























































































the extent to which each was causal will be made.  Ultimately, similar to the exercise 
conducted for Libya in Chapter III, a logical construct representing a simplification of the 
factors that have created the economic vicious cycle existent in Tunisia will be illustrated 
via this procedure. 
1. Quality of Regulation in Ben Ali’s Tunisia 
The World Bank’s Regulatory Quality variable is an attempt to capture 
“perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.”72  It utilizes 
portions of 14 different data sets (including the three others used in their entirety in this 
study) to produce an assessment of the condition in a country of such concepts as fairness 
of competition, burdensomeness of administrative regulations, effectiveness of anti-
monopoly policy, fairness of taxes and tariffs, status of foreign investment and banking, 
and ease of market entry for new firms.73  It is therefore logical that it would be highly 
correlated with the entrepreneurship variable in this study.   
The Ben Ali regime performed inadequately in this metric due to several 
structural issues that are in large part consequences of maintaining a highly centralized, 
authoritarian government.  Of the aforementioned factors contributing to this variable, the 
literature suggests the areas most consequential to Tunisia’s overall poor performance in 
this metric are the status of the banking system, the lack of fairness and arbitrariness in 
application of the tax system and the lack of fairness of competition as a result of 
clientelism.  Empirically-based analyses of the financial regulatory system in Tunisia 
have concluded that, despite improvements in monetary policy during the Ben Ali years, 
“in the long and short terms, financial repression has had significant and negative effects 
on financial development” in Tunisia.74  Exacerbating the difficulties resultant from 
repression of financial institutions was the perversely symbiotic relationship between 
                                                 
72 The World Bank, World Bank Governance Indicators (accessed July 15, 2012), 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf . 
73 Ibid. 
74 Nejib Hachicha, “Banking Sector Controls and Financial Deepening: A Structural Error Correction 
Model for Tunisia,” The Developing Economies 43, no. 2 (2005): 265. 
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government and banking institutions.  Specifically, over 20% of Tunisia’s loans were 
non-performing in 2007, and the same public banks were bailed out by the government 
successively over the years.  This was necessary (or at least understandable) when 
considering over 40% of bank assets in Tunisia were state owned, thus creating the 
almost mandatory requirement to ensure these banks did not fail, despite their lack of 
discipline.75  The derogatory effects of this arrangement have been palpable, as 
“management contracts and other reforms of their corporate governance have not solved 
the fundamental moral hazard underlying state ownership.”76   
Taxation is discussed in the following section, as it also represents a manifestation 
of the control the Ben Ali regime required that resulted in the complete lack of voice 
permitted to the populous.  Regarding fairness of competition, there was a lack of free 
and fair competition in the Tunisian markets during the Ben Ali era that affected the 
overall economy negatively.  Macroeconomic policy structures stunted Tunisia’s 
potential for improved economic advancement as a result.  Despite reforms in regulation 
including improving openness of trade through reduction of tariffs, Tunisia’s macro-
economic policy late in the Ben Ali years was well below the MENA average, outpacing 
only that of Lebanon, Yemen and Egypt.77  A significant portion of this lack of success in 
macroeconomic policy was due to the requirements incumbent upon policy-makers in a 
clientelist system wherein competition was neither free nor fair.  As will be more 
completely explained in the management level of difficulty section, groups and 
associations in Tunisia are extensions of the state apparatus which undermine the 
development of civil society while reinforcing clientelist dependencies.  Indeed, Tunisian 
“business associations are little more than vehicles for conveying state policy to the 
private sector.”78  Thus, business was unable to mobilize and create organizational  
 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
76 Najy Benhassine, From Privilege to Competition:  Unlocking Private-Led Growth in the Middle 
East and North Africa (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2009), 119. 
77 Ibid, 81–82. 
78 Melanie Cammet, “Business–Government Relations and Industrial Change: The Politics of 
Upgrading in Morocco and Tunisia,” World Development 35, no. 11 (November, 2007), 1897. 
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structures aimed at protecting their interests, and rather were forced to rely upon the 
strength of their relationship to government to produce a favorable environment for a 
particular industry. 
2. Voice and Accountability in Ben Ali’s Tunisia 
The most dramatic area of underperformance in Tunisia as indicated by 
quantitative measures of factors linked to economic advancement was the World Bank’s 
measure of a population’s voice in its government and the accountability that government 
has to the population.  Common sense would suggest that this failure was not only a 
factor integral to Tunisia’s lack of economic success, but was also to a large degree 
responsible for the revolution which ended the Ben Ali regime’s control of the country in 
2010–11.  Tunisia scored in the bottom 10% of all countries in the study in this metric, 
implying that the citizens of Tunisia had very little freedom of expression, freedom of 
association or ability to choose their own government, and that the media was unable to 
report impartially on matters involving the government without fear of reprisal.79  
Although explaining an important measure of governance that exposes the severe lack of 
democracy present within the authoritarian state headed by Ben Ali, it is the purpose of 
this paper to identify areas wherein improvement will create economic growth and 
advancement.  Therefore, this measure of governance will be analyzed through a prism 
focused upon the economy, rather than on the quality of government structures and 
policies the metric ostensibly provides. 
There is substantial evidence that this lack of voice was closely tied to the 
economic structure of the country during the Ben Ali era.  Economic means were used 
extensively to maintain control over business, and by extension the population as a 
whole.  Specifically, control of the population was implemented through “everyday 
economic mechanisms such as in the tax system, solidarity practices and the industrial 
mise a niveau.  These practices serve(d) both to advance the 'economic miracle' and 
                                                 
79 These areas are the components the World Bank’s Voice and Accountability metric attempt to 
measure, as provided at World Bank Governance Indicators (accessed July 15, 2012), 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/va.pdf . 
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simultaneously function(ed) as techniques of coercion and repression.”80  The mise a 
niveau was essentially forced upon entrepreneurs as a program that should be supported 
as a ‘civic gesture.’  While the international competition that entrepreneurs were forced to 
endure became methods of exercising control by the regime, this was made possible by 
the subsidies and advantages sought out and expected by the entrepreneurial class as a 
result of the traditional clientelist system dominant in Tunisia.81  Both regarding and 
independent from the mise a niveau, businessmen viewed “the constraints placed on 
private enterprise by the political system as the ‘price’ to be paid 
for...benefits…(including) social peace and geopolitical stability as well as market 
protectionism, fiscal exoneration, and administrative exemptions.”82   
Another of the constraints upon private enterprise involved an arbitrarily enforced 
tax system largely viewed as unfair within the country.  The tax system in Tunisia could 
be considered a method through which control was exerted, as the granting of fiscal 
amnesty was used to placate the business community and reconcile the executive of the 
government with business.  While these concerns with taxation were applicable to 
individuals as well as corporations, in many respects these aspects of repression were 
particularly applicable to the business community, wherein enforced taxation was 
conversely “perceived as an instrument of punishment.”83  Thus the tax system, as well 
as other methods of economic repression was a manifestation of a patently authoritarian 
system of governance in which the citizenry had a complete lack of voice.  These are 
some of the most significant examples of the system of economic repression used by Ben 
Ali both to ensure his domination of the country continued as well as to promote the 
illusion of the Tunisian “economic miracle.”  
                                                 
80 Hibou, “Domination & Control,” 185. The “industrial mise a niveau” refers to a World Bank and 
EU financed program implemented in 1996 designed to bring emerging industries up to standard for 
international competition. 
81 Ibid., 193–194. 
82 Ibid., 189. 
83 Ibid., 191. 
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3. Management Level of Difficulty in Ben Ali’s Tunisia 
The phenomena being measured by the BTI’s Management Level of Difficulty 
metric is less obvious than many of the other variables in this study based upon its title.  
There are evaluations of five separate factors that are averaged to determine the ultimate 
value of the metric for each country.  The first of these factors involves manifestations of 
structural constraints present within a society such as extensive poverty, inadequate 
infrastructure and insufficient economic diversification.  Other, more transparent, factors 
contributing to this metric are empirical analyses of the strength of civil society traditions 
present within a country, the intensity of any conflict within the country, a rescaled 
measure of purchasing power parity (PPP) GNI per capita, a rescaled measurement of the 
UN Education Index and an average of the BTI’s Stateness and Rule of Law scores.84  As 
previously discussed, Tunisia scores relatively well in several of these areas (as indicated 
by data from both the BTI and other sources), which necessitated the execution of an 
examination of each factor independently to determine the area of underperformance with 
more specificity.  
The indicator most lacking of those comprising this factor of the BTI was, in the 
case of Tunisia, the portion labeled “civil society traditions.”85  There is a lack of civil 
society in Tunisia which, though typical of MENA countries, is a limiting factor in both 
the creation of a liberal democracy as well as the construction of the successful economic 
structures which consensus suggests is able to develop more readily in such an 
environment.  Consider the supposition that “in Tunisia…non-governmental 
organizations are actually governmental. Similarly, the private sector is still highly 
dependent on the state for public interventions. Private intermediaries base their power on 
their proximity to the highest function, which is, of course, public.”86  This revelation of 
Tunisian societal structure underscores the control the Ben Ali exerted over the 
population.  His regime ultimately ensured—to the greatest degree possible—that all 
                                                 
84 Numbers taken from BTI 2012 data set. 
85 BTI 2012 data rates this portion of the variable a “7” on a 1–10 scale, with all other contributing 
factors to the variable (other than the education index which is discussed in more detail in Section B of this 
chapter) being rated  “5” or below (a lower score being more desirable in this particular metric). 
86 Hibou, “Domination and Control,” 197. 
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associations of persons were purview to governmental control, thereby retarding the 
development of healthy civil society structures and traditions.  Thus, the “management 
level of difficulty” metric as defined by the BTI is in this sense highly related to the 
WB’s “voice and accountability” variable, enhancing the logical connections between 
factors in the results of this analysis. 
4. Level of Socioeconomic Development in Ben Ali’s Tunisia 
Although superior to most comparator countries in the region, Tunisia’s level of 
socio-economic development is poor in several areas of particular significance.  The level 
of Tunisia’s socioeconomic development as discussed in the BTI is largely analogous to 
and based upon the HDI, which was discussed in Section B of this chapter.   Yet the 
BTI’s exploration of the data, in conjunction with other data sources, provides further 
elucidation to the analysis previously presented.  The BTI concludes that “Tunisia fares 
relatively poorly in terms of human poverty when compared to medium-developed 
countries in general, primarily due to its relatively high rate of adult illiteracy (23.1%).”87  
This confirms the assertion presented in Section B that education is a cause of the 
economic problems present in Tunisia.  This high level of poverty as a consequence of a 
relatively uneducated populous, as well as the observation by the BTI that the 
unemployment rate for young (20–24 year olds) and well-educated individuals was three 
times that of men over 40, not only defines areas in which improvement is required to 
create a higher level of human development, but also proved to be a source of the 
political upheaval that became manifest after the publication of the BTI report. 
However, performance in this area—due to its dependence upon basic statistical 
data that are consequences of the structures and policies existent in a country—can 
reasonably be considered an intermediate variable in this study.  The particular facets of 
the variable that contributed to Tunisia’s weakness in the metric as a whole (in particular 
the aforementioned educational and employment metrics) are likely more causal than the 
measurement of this factor when considered in its entirety.  The evidence for this 
                                                 
87 Information taken from Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 — Tunisia Country Report. Gütersloh: 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, 12, and is mirrored in the 2012 report, though adult illiteracy is estimated at 
22% in that publication. 
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assertion is more an evaluation founded in common sense than an empirically-based 
conclusion consistent with the previous portions of the study.  While to some degree 
every independent variable used in the study is based on more foundational data, this 
metric in particular seems a measure of outcomes rather than a representation of a cause. 
It will therefore be presented as such in the construction of the vicious cycle delineated in 
the following section. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The failings of the Ben Ali regime, even when considered from an economic 
perspective, appear to be more a consequence of the authoritarian governmental structure 
existent in Tunisia than poorly constructed or implemented economic policy.  Outside of 
the financial system and tax policy, the identified focus areas are less economic in nature 
and more societal structures founded in both tradition and authoritarian rule.88  This 
creates the potential for dramatic change to be realized with the ousting of the 
government, as the economic skeleton present in Tunisia is relatively healthy, outside of 
the directly and purposefully repressive measures identified in this chapter.  Consistent 
with the intent of this analysis, each analyzed area was found to have more fundamental 
causes, the specificity of which provides useful results for the incoming government.  
The combination of specific identified causes when considered with the intentionality of 
their implementation suggests that improvement can possibly become manifest merely 
through execution of policies that allow natural development through non-interference. 
                                                 
88 The weakness of the financial system and tax policy could be considered resultant of economic 
policy, though a reasonable argument could be made that they too were a result of the requirement to 
maintain tacit control of the population, as opposed to being due to a poor understanding of the 
macroeconomic consequences of their implementation. 
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Figure 2.   Tunisia’s Vicious Cycle 
The analysis of key areas in this chapter exhibited a surprising amount of overlap 
and common causal factors of metrics whose titles displayed little similarity.  Six factors 
were found to be fundamental causes inhibiting the economic advancement of Tunisia, 
and three of those helped to produce multiple intermediate effects.  Three variables from 
utilized datasets that were determined to be correlated with entrepreneurial environment 
or stage advancement in which Tunisia underperformed were identified as intermediate 
variables, with one (level of socioeconomic advancement) essentially a measure of 
outcomes.  Thus, the six causal elements are more specific and defined than was the case 
in Libya, where the multitude of problems precluded realization of such specificity, 
which is the ultimate goal of this study.  A repressive system in which taxes were used 
both as a method of repression and an instrument of control, a poor education system that 
creates an adult population with a high rate of illiteracy, a lack of opportunity for the 
young and well-educated disproportionate to older members of society exacerbating 
poverty and a state-led banking system resulting in perverse incentives and a lack of 
discipline are all both root causes of economic underperformance and methods of 
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maintaining authoritarian domination.  The final two causes—the prevalence of 
clientelism in business and lack of civil society traditions—are related in that business 
associations are a significant aspect of civil society, and again, governmental control of 
these areas ensured the voice of the population was suppressed, while simultaneously 
preventing Tunisia from realizing its economic potential. 
Figure 2 is a representation of the cycle of economic ineptitude that was in large 
part a product of political repression.  Improved policy creation, execution and 
enforcement by the incoming government of Tunisia in the areas identified as causal is 
herein determined to provide the path best able to realize economic advancement.  
However, even a retreat from the repressive policies of Ben Ali toward less intrusive, if 
not optimal policies will likely have significant positive consequences.  This will allow 
the diverse, and in many areas healthy, economy of Tunisia to flourish, and may lend 















V. AN ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ECONOMIC FOCUS AREAS 
FOR THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Each country’s Arab Spring experience has been unique.  While Tunisia 
experienced a revolution that resulted in a relatively peaceful transition from 
authoritarian rule, Libya’s revolution required armed conflict inclusive of international 
intervention to ultimately oust the incumbent regime.  Distinct from either of these was 
the Arab Spring experience of Egypt, which was not, in the strictest sense, a revolution at 
all.  The revolutionary element of popular uprising as manifested through mass protest 
proved insufficient to create a change in regime.  Rather, this revolutionary environment 
required the additional ingredient of the military’s abandonment of the regime of Hosni 
Mubarak to achieve the objectives of the revolutionaries.  This confluence of revolution 
and coup d’état has been coined as a “coupvolution,” an increasingly popular term 
reflecting both aspects of the expression of the Arab Spring unique to Egypt. 
 Egypt’s coupvolution was the consequence of a multitude of issues and 
grievances—political, economic and otherwise—many of which stemmed from a 
complicated historical political environment that is far beyond the scope of this paper.  
Egypt’s polity is a topic of enormous depth and complexity, making the task of 
generating vital economic focus areas daunting without the structure the methodology 
employed herein provides.  Though the process through which results are obtained 
undeniably simplifies an extremely complicated amalgamation of challenges, it has the 
advantage of relying upon quantitative data rather than qualitative analyses.  This reliance 
enables innumerable potential variables to be reduced to the few that are analyzed as 
potential critical areas, and facilitates the transition of an extremely difficult task into one 
more manageable.   
 The analysis of this chapter produced three areas in which improvement will most 
substantially effect positive economic change.  As with Libya and Tunisia, the 
insufficient political voice afforded the population, and a lack of accountability to the 
population by the Egyptian government is identified as an area of underperformance that 
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must be improved to engender an improved economy.  Egyptian labor markets are also 
found to be a critical area of weakness, with poorly-conceived laws and an inefficient 
bureaucracy in part responsible for creating an environment in which the informal or 
“shadow” economy is often perceived as preferable to the formal by executives of 
Egyptian firms.  Finally, endemic corruption that was poorly controlled and often 
sanctioned by the Mubarak government retarded firm creation by potential entrepreneurs, 
and was regarded as the most significant obstacle to doing business by practicing 
businessmen within the country.  These areas, the process by which they were identified, 
and the vicious cycle of economic futility they helped to create in Egypt will be explored 
in this chapter. 
B. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MUBARAK REGIME 
 During the years since Egypt attained independence in 1952, the condition of the 
economy has oscillated greatly (though around a rather low baseline) due to many factors 
including hydrocarbon prices, international political alliances, economic policy decisions 
and internal attempts to broaden public appeal through both economic and political 
liberalization.89  Egypt is in large part a rentier economy wherein substantial percentages 
of income are not only a result of hydrocarbon resources and labor remittances, but also 
are products of Suez Canal rents and tourism monies stemming from the rich ancient 
history of the country.  Thus, the leadership of Egypt must manage the difficult 
proposition of balancing the benefits of its unique circumstances and resources (i.e., 
availability of sources of income to the populous which otherwise would not be) with the 
economic difficulties these sources of income often cause the state (i.e. inability to tax 
effectively and lack of significant required infrastructure to maintain, inhibiting potential 
job growth).  This difficult economic situation was often exacerbated by the repressive 
policies of Hosni Mubarak, whose only efforts at economic liberalization were attempts 
“to retain political power in the face of a deteriorating economy,” particularly during 
periods of falling energy prices and worldwide recession causing reductions in foreign 
                                                 
89 See Henry and Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development, 162–197, for in-depth 
explanation of how some of these methods affected the Egyptian economy in disparate ways. 
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aid.90  However, in the decade prior to the coupvolution, economic reforms (often 
championed by Hosni Mubarak’s son, Gamal) were sporadically undertaken with varying 
degrees of success.  These policies may or may not have been planned to be accompanied 
by or precursors to political liberalization; though were that the intent it proved 
ineffective, as promised political reforms during Mubarak campaigns were generally 
reneged upon following an election.91   
Table 17.   Egypt’s Economic Performance vs. “Expected” 



























Maintaining the structure of previous chapters, the standard for measuring the 
success or failure of the Mubarak regime is, in the context of this work, determined 
through a comparison of its wealth as measured by per capita GNI/GDP to the average 
conditions in which the population exists, as derived from HDI.  Despite the obvious 
inadequacies of the Mubarak regime in terms of the political atmosphere he created and 
maintained within Egypt, a less qualitative determination of his regime’s performance is 
helpful in enhancing the quantitative foundation of this work.  Table 17 summarizes the 
relationship between Egypt’s wealth and the conditions which dictate the quality of 
human life, with Egypt performing lower in human development metrics than might be  
                                                 
90 Ibid., 190. 
91 Ibid., 191. 
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expected based upon its per capita income.  Thus, the suggestion of the quantitative 
evidence affirms that of the qualitative:  the Mubarak regime managed the Egyptian 
economy ineffectively. 
 The complexities of the Egyptian economy create a challenging environment 
within which the incoming government must work.  There are countless policies and 
decisions that, upon being implemented, will have both positive and negative effects on 
various portions of the population, and will be more or less effective depending upon 
other policies that may augment or undermine the effectiveness of the first.  This 
complexity is understood and appreciated, despite the techniques of reduction and 
extraction utilized in this work.  Indeed, it is because of the realization of the enormity of 
the task being undertaken by the post-Arab Spring government of Egypt that there is 
utility in the results found through the techniques executed herein.  The nearly limitless 
number of issues and structures that are pertinent to economic success likely preclude the 
government from effectively addressing them all simultaneously.  It is therefore the 
purpose of this paper to determine upon which areas the government should focus in 
order to realize positive economic transformation most efficiently.  Although not an end 
unto themselves, the following sections may offer—if nothing more—a place to begin to 
repair the patently unsuccessful management of the economy for which the Hosni 
Mubarak regime was responsible. 
C. IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC AREAS INHIBITING EGYPT’S 
ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
 Egypt, like Libya, has been determined by the World Economic Forum to fit 
within the parameters of Group 2 countries, or those in transition from having economies 
that are primarily factor-driven, to economies that are driven by efficiency.92  Thus, 
consistent with the analysis of previous chapters, the performance of Egypt in factors 
identified as key for growth, entrepreneurship and group advancement for Group 2 
countries will be examined in this section to determine areas in which improvement is 
most likely to produce significant results.  As with the analyses of Libya and Tunisia, all 
                                                 
92 World Economic Forum, “The Global Competitiveness Report,” 2010–2011, 9–11. 
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independent variables determined as key to each dependent variable will be analyzed 
successively, beginning with those variables found through factor analysis to be most 
highly correlated with growth. 
 For Group 2 countries, the factor analyses summarized in Chapter II found only 
two independent variables to be correlated with economic growth to any degree of 
statistical significance.  In both the analysis conducted inclusive of all countries as well 
as that which included only Group 2 economies, WEF Labor Market Efficiency and HH 
Labor Freedom were found to be the only independent variables highly correlated with 
economic growth.  As shown in Table 18, Egypt’s performance late in the Mubarak era 
was significantly poorer than the mean of both Group 2 and MENA countries.  Moreover, 
even Group 1 countries displayed a higher mean value in these variables than Egypt.  
Thus, a lack of freedom and efficiency in labor markets is identified as an area of 
underperformance in Egypt that has significantly constrained its growth in recent years.  
The details of this underperformance and how it has constrained growth will be explored 
in Section D. 




Variables Associated with Growth for All Groups and Group 2 only 












































Source: Author’s calculations based upon data from World Economic Forum (WEF) Global 
Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 and Heritage House Economic Freedom Scores 2011 (HH). 
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 Regarding metrics associated with creation of a positive entrepreneurial 
environment, more complex linkages were observed in the factor analyses.  As explained 
in previous chapters, the number of factors displaying a statistically significant 
correlation with entrepreneurship (whether primary or secondary) precludes them from 
inclusion in this analysis in their entirety.  Rather, HH Overall Freedom will be used as a 
proxy for the numerous measures of economic freedom that exhibited a correlation, and 
will be considered as a potential key area along with several other factors that were found 
to display linkages in multiple models.  The results of the analysis of Egypt’s 
performance in these variables are summarized in Table 19.  They are both logically 
consistent and very useful in the context of this study, as only two (quite related) 
variables were found to be potential causes of the poor entrepreneurial environment 
existent in Egypt.  Contrast this to Libya, wherein underperformance in virtually every 
area diminished the value of the results, as the purpose is to reduce the number of areas 
upon which the incoming government should focus to the few deemed most vital.  
Egypt’s performance in WB Regulatory Quality, BTI Private Property and HH Overall 
Freedom were in line with or slightly above expectations, with its measures lying 
between the mean performance of Group 2 and Group 3 economies.  In HH Property 
Rights, the value assigned to Egypt’s performance was higher than even the mean of 
Group 3 countries, making it an area of outperformance with respect to expectations.93  
However, in measures of both the prevalence of and acumen of the government in 
combatting corruption, Egypt scored below the Group 2 mean score, and significantly 
below the mean of MENA competitor nations.  It is therefore corruption which will be 
                                                 
93 This suggested outperformance is based upon the quantitative results derived in this study. There is 
substantial evidence that lack of property rights and ineffective legal protections to property owners creates 
serious concerns for potential entrepreneurs. In “Egypt’s Economic Apartheid,” The Wall Street Journal, 
February 3, 2011, Hernando DeSoto states that “92% of all Egyptians hold their property without normal 
legal title.”  Moreover, on average potential owners must negotiate through 10 years of red tape to get legal 
title to a vacant piece of property. This causes substantial disincentives for those attempting to begin 
businesses that risk interference from government beyond the norm, since the government can claim 
ownership of the property upon which the business would reside. It is also important to note that Group 1, 2 
and 3 economies all scored very low in this metric, with a considerable increase in performance noted 
between Group 3 and the most advanced and mature classification of Group 4. Thus, outperformance in the 
context of this study is a highly relative term, and should not be taken to imply that a lack of private 
property rights is not a concern in Egypt. 
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explored in Section D as the factor that most markedly inhibited the creation of a positive 
entrepreneurial environment in Egypt during the years prior to the Arab Spring. 
Table 19.   Egypt’s Performance in Key Entrepreneurship Metrics 
 
 
 The results of the discriminant analyses conducted in Chapter II indicated five 
potential variables were most important in classifying Group 2 countries from their more 
economically advanced counterparts in Group 3.  Specifically, BTI Management Level of 
Difficulty, WEF Technological Readiness, WB Voice and Accountability, BTI 
Organization of the Market and Competition and HH Fiscal Freedom were found to 
discriminate between groups in either the model conducted with only Group 2 and 3 
Variables Associated with Entrepreneurship for All Groups and Group 2 only 






































































































Source: Author’s calculations based upon data from Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2012 
(BTI), World Bank Governance Indicators 2010 (WB), and Heritage House Economic Freedom 
Scores 2011 (HH). 
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countries included or the model inclusive of all countries in the study.  Egypt performed 
within the range of expectations in three of the five variables, and outperformed in 
relation to group and regional competitor means in one.  However, in the World Bank’s 
Voice and Accountability metric, Egypt’s performance was considerably beneath all 
group means, including the least economically advanced countries in Group 1.  This 
suggests that a lack of voice of the people in government and a lack of accountability to 
the people by government in Egypt not only was a likely factor in the uprising that led to 
the “coupvolution” but also was an issue that precluded Egypt from advancing to a more 
mature economic stage. 
Table 20.   Egypt’s Performance in Key Advancement Metrics 
 
Significant Variables in Classifying All Groups and in Classifying Group 2 vs. 3 































































































Source: Author’s calculations based upon data from Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2012 
(BTI), World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, World Bank 
Governance Indicators 2010 (WB), and Heritage House Economic Freedom Scores 2011 (HH). 
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 Thus five independent variables representing three distinct topics have been 
herein identified as potential causes of the economic futility displayed by the Mubarak 
regime.  In the following section, issues prevalent in the Egyptian labor markets that 
create inefficiencies will be explored, as will governmental corruption, and deficiencies 
in the voice given and governmental accountability to the people.  These three thematic 
areas, through quantitative and comparative analysis have been shown to be highly 
correlated to Egypt’s poor economic performance, and may potentially be causal areas of 
concern. 
D. ANALYSIS OF MUBARAK REGIME’S PERFOMANCE IN KEY AREAS 
1. Labor Market Efficiency and Freedom in Mubarak’s Egypt 
 Labor markets are a complex segment of an economy with many facets 
contributing to their relative effectiveness.  Thus, more specificity is required regarding 
the particular components of the Egyptian labor markets which preclude them from 
performing efficiently.  An examination of the particular areas of deficiency in the 
Egyptian labor markets revealed five specific elements requiring attention.  Though these 
areas are derived from those metrics in the WEF data set wherein Egypt’s performance 
was particularly poor, the HH Labor Freedom variable will also be addressed through 
consideration of these factors.  They are 1) Cooperation in Labor-Employer Relations,  
2) Redundancy costs, 3) Reliance on Professional Management, 4) Brain Drain and  
5) Women in labor force.94  This section will provide a brief explanation of these 
particular areas of concern, how they relate to one another and the effects these 
deficiencies create in the economy as a whole.  It will further explain how the failures of 
the labor markets help to create and exacerbate the issue of a large informal economy, the 
existence of which retards economic growth in Egypt. 
 The labor market in Egypt is generally more contentious between employers and 
employees than average.  This may in part be explained by the low reliance upon 
                                                 
94 These were identified through analysis of the specific elements making up the WEF factor of 
“Labor Market Efficiency,” and Egypt’s performance in each. Of the nine elements comprising the factor, 
Egypt’s rating was particularly deficient in these five. 
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professional management in favor of nepotism and patrimonial relationships.  There is a 
cultural aspect to this which may be difficult to overcome.  However, the productivity of 
the workforce is undoubtedly undermined through this phenomenon.  The workforce in 
Egypt is performing below capabilities and expectations according to the studied metrics, 
which results in poorer economic performance on a firm by firm basis, and ultimately 
undermines the productivity of the country as a whole.  Redundancy costs in Egypt are 
exorbitant.  Specifically, nearly 2.5 years of salary is required to fire a tenured worker, 
and over 6 months of salary is standard even for a worker only employed for 5 years.95 
This precludes employers from dismissing the least productive workers, and thus 
prevents them from replacing these employees with potentially more productive (and 
presumably currently unemployed) workers.  Once again, poorly conceived laws prevent 
maximization of productivity.  The result is a less-than-optimal workforce, which is 
exacerbated by the final two issues in the labor market:  the brain drain and lack of 
female participation in the workforce.  Due to the previous (and ongoing) political 
instability, cultural issues inherent in a largely Islamic society and lack of opportunity 
(among other reasons), Egypt does not keep many of its best minds, nor does it exploit 
the talents of the women that might potentially enrich it.  Thus, the potential of the 
Egyptian labor force is weakened, further detracting from the overall performance of the 
economy.  These failures, along with the others touched upon herein, prevent the 
Egyptian labor market from performing efficiently.  Exacerbating the problem is the fact 
that “in the absence of a well-functioning labor market, informal labor activity persists in 
many sectors” of the Egyptian economy.96  Essentially, the labor market issues create a 
business environment in which the norm involves paying workers in cash and producing 
illegitimate accounting documents in efforts to reduce taxation and avoid adherence to 
labor laws.  This results in the creation of an unofficial or “shadow” economy which, 
while present in many developing countries, is particularly prevalent in Egypt. 
                                                 
95 World Economic Forum, “The Global Competitiveness Report,” 2011–2012, 169. 
96 Heritage House Index of Economic Freedom, Egypt (accessed August 18, 2012), 
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2012/countries/egypt.pdf. 
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 There are significant difficulties associated with the existence of this shadow 
economy.  In 2004 the shadow economy employed 43.0% of working Egyptians.97  This 
dwarfed both the 26.5% employed by the public sector and the 30.5% employed by the 
private sector.98 All shadow economy business and property was estimated in 2004 to be 
worth $248 billion, or approximately $400 billion in 2011 dollars.  Compare this to the 
GDP of Egypt, which was estimated by the World Bank at $219 billion in 2010. 99  This 
huge shadow economy is counterproductive to long-term economic growth for several 
reasons.  First, underground businesses lack access to organizational structures that may 
foster growth (i.e. they are unable to incorporate, cannot become publically traded, etc.).  
Also, owners cannot issue bonds to get credit, which limits their ability to grow and serve 
new markets.  It is also difficult for these businesses to get the best technical help and 
management since contracts are not enforced through normal legal mechanisms.100  
Finally, an extensive bureaucracy in Egypt prevents the spawning of new businesses, as 
well as the admission of shadow economy businesses into the legal economy.  When 
coupled with the previously discussed inefficiencies in the labor markets existent in 
Egypt, the ineffective and redundant bureaucracy and laws that can frustrate and 
discourage potential entrepreneurs, the result is an environment that ultimately serves to 
keep these businesses in the shadow economy.  This both hinders their growth and 
prevents government oversight and taxation, ultimately diminishing the overall economic 
growth of the country. 
                                                 
97 Other estimates of the shadow economy in Egypt dwarf even this figure. See for example Friedrich 
Schneider and Dominik H. Enste, “Shadow Economies:  Size, Causes and Consequences,” Journal of 
Economic Literature XXXVIII, (March 2000), 80, in which the shadow economy of Egypt as a percent of 
GDP from 1990–1993 is estimated at 68–76%. Though these figures are from a less recent source, it is 
unlikely that the shadow economy of Egypt decreased in size to that degree in the last 10–15 years, thus 
exposing the ambiguity present in estimations of this phenomenon. 
98 Data extrapolated from numbers in Hernando DeSoto, “Egypt’s Economic Apartheid,” The Wall 
Street Journal, February 3, 2011. 
99 Estimates for GDP from The World Bank Development Indicators (accessed March 3, 2012), 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/egypt-arab-republic and estimates for shadow economy from DeSoto, 
“Egypt’s Economic Apartheid.”  
100 This section draws heavily from DeSoto, “Egypt’s Economic Apartheid.” 
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2. Freedom from and Control of Corruption in Mubarak’s Egypt 
 Corruption is prevalent in Egypt, as it is in most developing economies.  
According to the Global Integrity Report (GIR), “even before the citizen-led revolution 
that rocked Egypt in January 2011, the country had been experiencing a slow and steady 
decline in the performance of its anti-corruption and transparency institutions.”101  Figure 
3 shows the decline in the control of this corruption, supporting the conclusions of the 
GIR.  It was presumably the poor trend of this metric, as well as its current unsatisfactory 
rank, that resulted in the mandate for change and improvement expressed by the citizens 
of Egypt in early 2011.  Prior to the coupvolution, “corruption (was) perceived as 
widespread…bribery of low-level civil servants seem(ed) to be a part of daily life, and 
there (were) allegations of significant corruption among high-level officials.”102  As these 
comments suggest, significant documentation exists regarding the presence of and lack of 
institutional control of corruption by the government (inclusive of its potential 
involvement).  However, it is the purpose of this paper to link this corruption to economic 
inefficiencies; specifically in this case to spawning an environment not conducive to 
entrepreneurship.  Thus, while there is little doubt that this widespread corruption was not 
controlled by the Mubarak regime, the assertion of this paper that will be explored more 
completely in this section is that this failure contributed to the creation of a poor business 
environment retarding potential entrepreneurship in Egypt. 
 
                                                 
101 Global Integrity Report, Egypt, accessed March 3, 2012, 
http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/Egypt/2010/. 




Figure 3.   Egypt Control of Corruption Ranking (1996–2010) 
 Within the MENA region, corruption is a significant constraint to business in 
many countries, though this problem is not uniform.  Egypt has been identified through 
World Bank enterprise surveys as a member of the cadre of countries for which 
corruption is seen as a major constraint by businessmen, along with Lebanon, West Bank 
and Gaza, Syria and Yemen.  Businessmen from other MENA countries such as Jordan, 
Algeria, Morocco, Oman and Saudi Arabia report corruption as a much less significant 
constraint to their firms.103  The WEF provides evidence for the assertion that improving 
freedom from corruption is a critical factor in fostering entrepreneurship through the 
inclusion of corruption as a potential factor considered most problematic for doing 
                                                 
103 For exact percentages of firm managers who rate corruption as a major or severe constraint to their 
business in each country, see Benhassine, From Privilege to Competition, 92–93. 
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business in its Executive Opinion Survey.  In this survey, businessmen in each 
participating country are asked to choose amongst 15 potential factors and rank in order 
the five most problematic for doing business in their opinion.  In the case of Egypt, 
corruption was cited as the most problematic factor for doing business, with a weighted 
average of 19% which was far and away the most prevalent of any potential concern.104  
Thus, the required bribes and “under the table” dealings appear to have significant 
economic consequences in constraining firms by “distract(ing) managers from running 
their businesses, imped(ing) certain areas, or mak(ing) types of operation more 
vulnerable to rent seeking.”105  Therefore, combining the data from these sources, Egypt 
is an economy in which corruption is pervasive, and that corruption detracts from the 
productivity of current businesses.  
 It is likely that the effects of corruption are not only detrimental to current 
businesses, but also upon potential start-ups.  One can, with a high degree of confidence, 
extrapolate from these results that potential entrepreneurs are inhibited from starting 
businesses just as current entrepreneurs are sufficiently concerned to identify corruption 
as the largest problem of any of the 15 structural or institutional elements proffered in the 
Executive Opinion Survey.  This corruption can also be linked to the prevalence of the 
shadow economy, as legitimate businesses are often subject to the same indiscretions as 
illegitimate, reducing the advantages of becoming part of the official economic apparatus 
of the country.  Corruption thereby provides the genesis for the poor entrepreneurial 
environment and lack of incentive to participate in the licit economy in Egypt. 
3. Voice and Accountability in Mubarak’s Egypt 
 Egypt ranked 89 out of the 102 countries in this study in the voice and 
accountability metric.  Similar to the trend observed in the control of corruption variable, 
Figure 4 shows a steady decline in voice and accountability in Egypt from 1996 through 
2010.  This decline no doubt served as a significant catalyst for the initiation of the Arab 
Spring movement which ultimately ousted Hosni Mubarak.  Considering the importance 
                                                 
104 World Economic Forum, “The Global Competitiveness Report,” 2010–2011, 148. 
105 Benhassine, From Privilege to Competition, 93. 
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of the expectations of the population when determining the potential effects and 
consequences of performance in any metric, this decline is likely as important (if not 
more so) than the absolute measure. This is because superior performance in the past 
(though marginal) may have created an expectation that increasingly failed to be met by a 
regime that provided fewer and fewer outlets for participation and became less and less 
accountable to the public in recent years. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Egypt’s Voice and Accountability Ranking (1996–2010) 
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As discussed in Chapter III, it is difficult to determine a direct link between 
improved perceptions of ability to participate and have freedoms within a country and its 
economic performance, and this section of this thesis will not attempt to do so.  However, 
it is less difficult, and in fact quite evident, that there is a positive correlation between 
democracy and economic advancement, with nearly all of the most advanced economies 
in the world rated as “free” by Freedom House.106  The findings in this thesis confirm 
this link, and ultimately suggest that it is self-evident that improving the voice of a 
country’s citizenry will have positive economic effects.  These effects include, in the case 
of Egypt, reducing the unchecked corruption currently constraining Egypt’s economy (in 
which governmental officials have been implicated) as a function of becoming more 
answerable to the people.  Also, policy construction and implementation in Egypt may be 
due to high level positions being filled based more upon merit than familial or 
patrimonial networks; this as a direct result of government becoming more accountable to 
the populous. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 The causal elements of economic ineptitude manifest in Egypt during the final 
years of the Mubarak regime are results of both authoritarian leadership implementing 
typical methods of power consolidation and counterproductive laws and norms that fail to 
exploit the talents and resources inherent in the society.  Improvements in both economic 
policy (inclusive of legal reform and bureaucratic simplification) and political structure 
are required to best effect positive change.  The economic and political issues with which 
this large and complex country is faced are innumerable.  Many of the most often 
analyzed areas of concern were mentioned only briefly in this chapter, including the 
problems inherent in a largely rentier economy and an education system that fails to meet 
expectations, particularly at the primary level.107  It is therefore in no way suggested that 
the conclusions of this analysis present a complete picture of the deficiencies of the 
                                                 
106 Freedom House, Freedom in the World (accessed August 19, 2012), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world . 
107 Egypt ranked 126th out of the 139 countries analyzed in the 2010–2011 Global Competitiveness 
Report in the “Quality of Primary Education” metric. World Economic Forum, “The Global 
Competitiveness Report,” 2010–2011, 149. 
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Egyptian economy, nor the areas that must be addressed to create prosperity.  Rather, the 
conclusions of this chapter are offered as a starting point, from which many of the other, 




Figure 5.   Egypt’s Vicious Cycle 
 Figure 5 expresses the main findings of this research for the particular case of 
Egypt.  The lack of voice and accountability has been a consistent theme of inadequacy 
throughout this thesis; this is unsurprising considering the countries analyzed in the study 
were chosen due to a change in government occurring as a result of some manner of 
revolution.   The authoritarian regimes ousted via Arab Spring uprisings all failed in this 
regard, and the Mubarak regime in Egypt was certainly no exception.  For Egypt, this 
lack of accountability resulted in extensive corruption in addition to the obvious political 
instability it created, which contributed to a large informal economy and an economic 
environment not conducive to entrepreneurship.  A less political concern more based 
upon societal norms and ineffective laws is the issue of labor markets.  In this area, both 
inside and out of government, the patrimonial and familial linkages that provide 
pathways to power and success create inefficient labor markets inclusive of a dissatisfied 
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and often disenfranchised labor force—particularly professional and management-level 
workers.  Moreover, these inefficient labor markets—combined with a laboriously 
extensive bureaucracy saturated with corruption—inhibit business growth and leads to a 
lack of incentive for businesses to engage in the legitimate economy of Egypt.  Thus, the 
advantages which might become manifest as a consequence of participation in the licit 
economy by businesses (such as legal protections through incorporation and access to 
external investment monies through becoming a publicly-traded company) are not 
exploited by many businesses.  This in turn retards their potential growth, and also 
prevents the government from benefiting from potential income through legitimate 
taxation.  Thus, the vicious cycle of Egypt, at least in this respect, is clear.  Though far 
from comprehensive, the issues explained and analyzed herein, if focused upon by the 
incoming government of Egypt, may provide the first steps on the path to economic 


























 The statistically-based methodological structure utilized in this thesis is the 
foundation of the work, and can be applied to any developing economy.  It is therefore 
important that implications of the research not specific to the particular countries studied 
herein are intimated as they may suggest areas for further study.  While the genesis of 
this work was a product of the events of the Arab Spring, due to the unique circumstances 
of near-simultaneous regime change in several MENA countries which suggest 
significant opportunity for change exists within them, the results of the statistical work 
undertaken has the potential to be utilized by any developing economy.  The conclusions 
of each chapter are an attempt to determine the areas for the incoming governments of 
these countries to prioritize most highly, and those conclusions will not be reiterated here; 
however, the more general conclusions that may provide areas for further research should 
be examined in more detail.   No information not previously discussed will be contributed 
in this concluding chapter.  These areas for further research are ideas that have been 
considered in the body of this thesis, though they were not integral to the conclusions 
derived for the specific countries analyzed resultant of their Arab Spring experience. 
 The statistical correlations determined in Chapter II intimated other potential 
insights not specific to the three countries focused upon in this study.  Beyond the 
country-specific conclusions intimated in the final sections of Chapters III, IV, and V, 
this study provides evidence for at least three important conclusions of a more 
fundamental and generally applicable nature.  First, it is rare in quantitatively-based 
studies to have such unambiguous and strong results as those derived in Chapter II 
regarding the correlation between economic growth and efficacy of labor markets for 
developing economies.  Although this link has been considered and analyzed by scholars 
in the past, this work provides convincing quantitative evidence that a strong correlation 
does, in fact, exist between improvement in labor market efficiencies and freedoms and 
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the overall economic growth a country enjoys.108  This may provide focus for further 
research projects in developmental economics, particularly in determining the specific 
areas of labor markets in a polity that retard growth, and finding methods whereby these 
issues may be remedied. 
 Second, the common link between the three country-specific analyses conducted 
in the previous chapters was extremely limited participation in government by the people 
and a lack of accountability to the people by those governments.  This was evidenced by 
the uniformly egregious performance in the WB Voice and Accountability metric in all 
three countries studied.  In fact, they were all among the bottom 13 countries in this 
metric of the 102 country data set.  Not only does this work examine the unique ways in 
which this deficiency contributed to poor economic performance, it also implies that this 
metric, more than any other, is linked to high potential for instability, as all three of the 
governments studied were ultimately overthrown.  While this conclusion may at first 
appear obvious, other variables (for instance WB’s Political Stability) may also have 
been determined to exhibit this relationship, but did not—at least not to the same degree 
as the voice and accountability metric.  This may suggest there is predictive value to the 
metric heretofore unproven, which may also prove useful in subsequent research.   
 Finally, as was briefly touched upon in Chapter V, an interesting observation 
regarding the HH Property Rights variable and group advancement suggests an area for 
potentially beneficial further research.  Specifically, though a slight improvement in 
protection of private property rights was observed beginning with the least advanced 
economies, there was dramatic improvement in this metric in the most advanced 
economies compared to all other groups.  This massive increase from a percentile rank of 
53.5% for Group 3 countries to 91.1% for Group 4 was the largest such gap of any 
independent variable for which a calculation was made.  This may suggest that legal 
protection of property rights is a vital area for which improvement is necessary to reach 
                                                 
108 See Julie C. Devlin, Challenges of Economic Development in the Middle East and North Africa 
Region:  World Scientific Studies in International Economics, Vol. 8. (London: World Scientific, 2010) for 
one such analysis, wherein she dedicates a chapter to the proposition that labor markets may be the key to 
economic growth for MENA countries. 
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the most mature stage of economic development.  Figure 6 graphically depicts this 





Figure 6.   HH Property Rights Scores by Group Categorization 
 More germane to the focus of this thesis, and beyond these general observations, 
is the assertion that the power transitions precipitated by the Arab Spring revolutions 
afford opportunity for significant positive political and economic change.  However, the 
specific areas in which improvement is most essential to generating economic 
advancement are less obvious than those associated with improved governance, and are 
less likely to be uniform across all countries involved.  In consideration of that assertion, 
this thesis has identified areas most correlated with economic growth, the fostering of a 
positive entrepreneurial environment and progression to a more advanced economic stage 
of development through employment of two distinct statistical methods, and applied them 
to three North African countries affected by the Arab Spring revolutions.  Areas in which 
improvement is required to create positive change that are specific to each economy 
studied have thereby been determined.  The cases of pre-Arab Spring Libya, Tunisia and 














of governmental construction and reform the incoming administrations of each country 
will face.  The ultimate outcome of the analysis involved an expression of the vicious 
economic cycle unique to each, including a determination of causal factors identified as 
areas in which improvement will be most likely to favorably transform their economies.  
 The uniqueness of each vicious cycle is a product of each country’s performance 
in the specific areas found through statistical analysis to be correlated to economic 
growth, creation of a positive entrepreneurial environment or advancement to a 
subsequent stage of economic development.  Although there was some overlap observed 
among themes vital to the countries in the study, the results of the analysis undertaken 
herein elucidated focus areas distinct to each country’s particular circumstances that are 
dependent upon the current structure of each economy, enhancing the value of the 
approach.  The number of areas upon which Libya must focus in order to improve its 
economy suggests that the task of developing a healthy economy from its current 
structure is far more difficult than that present in the current situation of either Tunisia or 
Egypt.  However, the relatively small population of the country, combined with its 
hydrocarbon wealth, may provide the tools necessary to implement change 
successfully—if the areas causing its vicious cycle are properly managed.  The situation 
in Tunisia appears less dire, with policies that allow the natural maturation process of the 
economy to occur without interference potentially being sufficient to effect positive 
change.  In Egypt, the size and complexity of the economy complicates the process of 
creating and implementing change, despite less extensive areas requiring address.  In all 
three cases, the conclusion of this work intimates that improving the areas identified as 
causal to its economic vicious cycle will produce the best results in efforts to revitalize 
the condition of each post-Arab Spring economy. 
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